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Part a:  PreiMPlantation genetic Diagnosis – ProviDing new 
etHical cHallenges? 
1  introDuction
The aim of this section is to identify a number of concerns about PGD and to discuss new ethical 
challenges framed by those concerns in the context of current and foreseeable applications in 
the area of pre-birth genetics.
Between 1981 and 2000, a total of 1112 genes responsible for mutations leading to monogenic 
diseases were discovered.1 Among the most serious disorders caused by single gene defects are 
cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, Huntington’s disease, the thalassaemias, sickle 
cell disease, haemophilia and some uncommon hereditary cancers.2 While tests have been 
developed to identify both carriers and sufferers of these genetic conditions, these advances 
have not yet resulted in cures for the disorders in question. Instead, one of the most significant 
uses of these tests has been in the area of reproduction, where they are used to enable parents to 
discover information about the genetic makeup of their future child and to make reproductive 
decisions accordingly.3
Genetic testing undertaken to enhance choices about future offspring can be undertaken either 
during pregnancy, when a woman undergoes testing to discover if the fetus she is carrying 
is at risk of a genetic disease (prenatal testing) or (more infrequently) prior to pregnancy 
when embryos are tested during IVF to determine their genetic status (preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis or PGD). Most testing conducted in the context of reproduction has been 
undertaken to test for the presence of genetic factors that are likely to directly affect the health 
of the child-to-be in predictable ways. 
While prenatal genetic testing is now a routine part of prenatal care in most countries, 
PGD is far less common. This is because it is an expensive and highly invasive procedure. 
While annually hundreds of thousands of couples undergo prenatal testing to date, current 
predications are that only a few hundred babies have been born as a result of PGD.4 Another 
significant clinical difference is that while prenatal testing is commonly undertaken to test for 
around 1,500 monogenic diseases and chromosomal abnormalities,5 PGD can presently only 
test for a small number of chromosomal abnormalities and 30 or so monogenic diseases at the 
1-2 cell stage.6 
These clinical differences are not, however, reflected in the way the two technologies are 
regulated. While PGD has provoked specific regulatory responses in the countries that allow it, 
prenatal testing has attracted no such targeted regulation and operates within the confines of 
existing legislation around abortion. As a result, while countries that allow PGD have placed 
tight restrictions upon its use, allowing it only to be used to avoid the birth of children who are 
at significant risk of a serious genetic disease (although what is considered ‘serious’ can differ 
between countries), decisions around prenatal testing and selective abortion are still largely 
private decisions made between a woman and her doctor, within the confines of abortion 
legislation in the jurisdiction concerned. 
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2  iMPact on Prenatal liFe
In what ways is the new technique of PGD preferable to prenatal testing? Although PGD is 
clinically more involved, it is considered by some to be preferable, since it allows genetic testing 
to be undertaken at a very early stage of fetal development, and thereby avoids a woman having 
to undergo a termination of pregnancy if the fetus is found to have an unwanted genetic 
condition. This, however, raises a complex moral question: is destroying an embryo less 
morally problematic than terminating a pregnancy? 
How one considers the distinction between prenatal testing and PGD will be influenced by what 
value is attributed to prenatal life. This will depend on our views about when the early human 
embryo becomes a being which can bear rights and to whom we owe obligations. Differing 
moral arguments have been proposed to assist our deliberations in the determination of what 
moral status we should attribute to prenatal life. Some (holding the ‘conservative’ position) 
attribute moral status to prenatal life at, or soon after, the moment of conception. Others hold 
the view that moral status is tied to personhood. The ‘gradualist’ view falls somewhere between 
these two positions and asserts there is no final answer to the question of when the fertilised 
egg becomes a person with valid moral status. 
The stage at which genetic testing takes place is generally, but not always, considered morally 
significant. The gradualist view (that we owe more duties to a fetus nearer the time of birth 
than we do to an early embryo) entails that fetal testing is morally more problematic than 
PGD since it may ultimately involve the killing of human life at a relatively late stage of its 
development.7 The ‘conservative’ view (where prenatal life is valued from the moment of 
conception) entails that prenatal testing and PGD are equally morally wrong, since they both 
involve the destruction of a human life.8 This strict moral view entails that it is just as morally 
wrong to destroy an embryo as it is to terminate a pregnancy once established. 
While it may initially seem in terms of the potential impact on prenatal life that the limits 
for prenatal testing should be tighter than for PGD (since prenatal testing during pregnancy 
potentially leads to the destruction of prenatal life at a later stage of development), the question 
is complicated by two significant issues. First, tightening the grounds for abortion following 
the results of genetic testing would involve altering the present scope of abortion laws and be 
seen as an unacceptable restriction on a woman’s access to abortion. Second, unlike prenatal 
testing, PGD can only occur if embryos have already been created for the purposes of IVF. 
To many, it is the creation of prenatal life for the purposes of genetic analysis (not merely its 
destruction) that singles out PGD as being more morally problematic than prenatal testing. 
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PGD, the creation of life, and impact on offspring
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis cannot take place unless embryos are available for 
genetic analysis. The process therefore necessarily involves the creation and selection of 
some embryos in preference to others. Embryos that are not selected will be destroyed, 
stored, or used for research purposes. The fact that preimplantation genetic diagnosis relies 
on the creation, selection, rejection, and possible destruction of embryos is a significant 
reason why preimplantation genetic diagnosis is subject to such intense scrutiny. Since 
PGD can only take place if embryos are created specifically for genetic analysis, it is 
morally wrong to create embryos for testing only for non-health related conditions or 
‘trivial’ characteristics. In terms of safety, current indications are that the removal of 
cells from the early embryo during the process of preimplantation genetic diagnosis for 
analysis has no long-term effects on the ‘child-to-be’, although recent reports have called 
for ongoing studies to confirm that this is indeed the case. This suggests a second reason 
why it seems right to exercise some degree of caution in relation to how PGD should be 
used, and restrict it to cases where parents seek to avoid the birth of offspring with serious 
genetic disease.
3  PgD anD tHe creation oF eMBryos
The fact that PGD can only occur if embryos have been created for the purposes of IVF leads 
some to challenge PGD on the basis that it is unacceptable as it involves the instrumentalisation 
of early human life. This objection is superimposed on the objection held by some against the 
creation of embryos that will not be implanted, which is standard in IVF practice.  PGD cannot 
take place unless embryos are available for genetic analysis. The process therefore necessarily 
involves the creation and selection of some embryos in preference to others. Embryos that are 
not selected will be destroyed, stored, or used for research purposes. The fact that PGD relies on 
the creation, and the possible selection, rejection, and destruction of embryos is a significant 
reason why PGD is subject to such intense scrutiny, despite the fact that it seems prima facie 
less morally worrying, since it involves the genetic analysis of prenatal life at a much earlier 
stage of development than prenatal testing. 
While it is tempting to polarise the debate around the acceptability of these technologies as 
hinging upon whether one adheres to the ‘right to life’ view or the ‘no interest’ view of prenatal 
life, this dichotomy does not encapsulate the complexity of the arguments surrounding what 
duties we owe to prenatal life. John Robertson has explained the situation in the following 
way: 
PGD is ethically controversial because it involves the screening and likely destruction 
of embryos, and the selection of offspring on the basis of expected traits. While persons 
holding right to life views will probably object to PGD for any reason, those who view 
the early embryo as too rudimentary in development to have rights or interests see no 
principled objection to all PGD. They may disagree, however, over whether particular 
reasons for PGD show sufficient respect for embryos and potential offspring to justify 
intentional creation and selection of embryos. 9  
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This highlights one of the most difficult problems with PGD, namely the fact that even those 
who think that early embryos have limited or no rights, appear to contradict this view when 
they do not think it is acceptable to create embryos for reasons that are seen as ‘trivial’ or 
unimportant. It is this act of creation (rather than the act of genetic analysis, selection, and 
possible destruction) which even some of those who hold the ‘no interest’ view feel ‘debases the 
inherent dignity of all human life’.10  
 
4  iMPact on tHe cHilD-to-Be anD tHe cHanging nature oF  
 reProDuction
A significant point of difference between prenatal testing and PGD is that the process of PGD 
is still surrounded by questions of how it will affect the child resulting from the process. The 
two main concerns surrounding the ‘child-to-be’ relate to issues of safety and the potential for 
the child to suffer damaging psychological consequences arising from learning that they were 
‘chosen’ on the basis of observable genetic preferences. 
In terms of safety, current indications are that the removal of cells from the early embryo 
during the process of PGD for analysis has no long-term effects on the ‘child-to-be’, although 
recent reports have called for ongoing studies to confirm that this is indeed the case.11 This 
might suggest that until we can be certain that no harm is done to the ‘child-to-be’ through the 
use of the technique, it seems right to exercise some degree of caution in relation to how PGD 
should be used. This approach, however, raises a number of ethical questions. What degree 
of caution should be adopted? How do we determine the level of protection accorded to the 
embryo (or future child) in considering the limits of reproductive technologies?  What types 
of harm would it be necessary to establish before the state may assume a legitimate role in 
regulating reproduction and what evidence will be acceptable to establish these harms? 
In its recent review of the UK’s regulation of reproduction, the House of Commons Science 
and Technology Committee adopted the approach that ‘[r]eproductive and research freedoms 
must be balanced against the interests of society but alleged harms to society, too, should 
be based on evidence’.12 In a pluralistic society it is unlikely that consensus will ever be 
achieved in relation to these issues. While views on all sides should be respected, there must 
be some method of navigating a path between them. This itself raises a central question which 
underpins the whole regulatory framework of reproductive medicine, namely how far is the 
state justified in intervening to limit the reproductive lives of its citizens? What position we 
take will most likely be influenced by whether we begin by accepting the presumption that the 
state has a role in regulating reproduction, or whether we take the reverse position, namely 
the presumption that the state should not intervene in private reproductive decisions unless 
evidence of harm is available, for example, the Ethics Committee of the American Society of 
Reproductive Medicine has suggested that ‘serious reasons … must be provided if a limitation 
on reproductive freedom is to be justified.’13 
More difficult issues arise when we move away from questions of immediate safety and turn 
to consider how genetic technologies may impact on the emotional and psychological stability 
of the child born from these techniques. It is important to bear in mind that while prenatal 
testing involves the decision to either keep or abort a child which the parents find ‘undesirable’, 
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in PGD ‘a whole range of embryos are scrutinised and tested’ and the choice is between the 
‘best in the class’.14 This has raised concerns that some limits need to be placed upon what the 
President’s Council on Bioethics calls the ‘parental desire for quality control’.15 The question 
is: will this unprecedented power in the hands of the parents necessarily be used for the good 
of the child? Should parents be willing to gamble the safety of their children for the chance to 
make them ‘better than well?’ What risks to their health and safety are worth taking in pursuit 
of improvement or perfection? 
While both prenatal testing and PGD are predicated on the assumption that it is acceptable for 
parents to avoid the birth of certain kinds of children based on their ‘genetic endowment’, in 
the case of prenatal testing the process has been described as more of a ‘weeding-out’ of those 
kinds of children who are not wanted rather than a ‘selecting-in’ process which pertains to 
PGD.16 The President’s Council on Bioethics has warned that using genetic technologies such 
as prenatal testing and PGD to select one child over another may raise significant concerns 
about how these technologies may ultimately change the nature of parenthood, our views 
about children, and society in general.17
Fears are sometimes voiced that new genetic technologies will change the nature and meaning of 
reproduction. Rather than childbearing being an act of love where parents accept their children 
for who they are, no matter what their genetic endowment, genetic diagnosis of the embryo 
or fetus is seen to alter the essential act of procreation. Procreation has traditionally been seen 
to be an act of acceptance of the children which fate bestows rather than a relationship where 
parents view children as products that can be shaped and engineered to meet their desires and 
wants.18 This view is encapsulated in the following quote: 
[Children] are, in an important sense, “given” to us. Though they are our children, they 
are not our property. Though they are our flesh and blood, and deeply kin, they are also 
independent “strangers” who arrive suddenly out of the darkness and whom we must 
struggle to get to know. Though we may seek to have them for our own self-fulfilment, 
they exist also and especially for their own sakes. Though we seek to educate them, they 
are not like our other projects, determined strictly according to our plans and serving only 
our desires. 19
This dichotomy which contrasts natural reproduction (in which children are categorised as 
a ‘blessing’) with assisted reproduction (in which children are labelled more as products of 
their parents’ desires) seems in some ways to be too simplistic to describe the complexities of 
reproduction in the 21st century. One point often made against this stark categorisation is that 
there are many ways in which parents may shape their children, both before and after birth. An 
essential part of parenting is moulding our children to meet the demands of the family, prepare 
them for adulthood, and give them the skills to interact meaningfully in society. Different 
societies impose differing responsibilities on the family, all based, until now, on the natural 
process of reproduction. Genetic technology that allows us to choose the characteristics of our 
offspring provides new challenges to this fragile balance. While a certain degree of ‘moulding’ 
of offspring is not only tolerated, but expected, in some contexts, the degree of ‘manipulation’ 
(when conducted at the genetic level) is seen to elevate the scope for parental influence to an 
unacceptable level. 
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Cultural differences also play a significant role in the way children are regarded and cared for.20 
The principle of reproductive autonomy provides that parents have the right to choose when 
to have children, but this is not universally understood to bestow the wider right of the power 
to choose what kind of a child to have. Reproductive cloning, for example, is almost universally 
condemned on the basis not only of safety, but because it would open the door for parents to 
choose conclusively the genetic endowment of their children. PGD is also seen to be morally 
problematic because it too allows parents much control over the selection of one embryo in 
favour of another. 
It may reasonably be argued that a real reason why we should be cautious about accepting an 
unrestrained principle of reproductive autonomy to use PGD to choose characteristics in our 
offspring is the fact that if left unchecked, it may bring about subtle but important changes 
in the relationship between parent and child. Some have argued that this subtle change has 
already taken place and that some degree of judging the ‘fitness’ of prospective children is 
currently already undertaken when we use prenatal testing to select against serious genetic 
conditions that will affect the health of the child.21 This current level of interference is justified, 
however, by arguing that current uses are aimed at producing a ‘healthy or disease-free baby’, 
whereas if we allow parents to select for desired traits ‘[s]uch an enlarged degree of parental 
control over the genetic endowments of their children cannot fail to alter the parent-child 
relationship’.22
There remains a significant level of disagreement about how arguments such as these should 
be dealt with. While the welfare of the child is an important guiding ethical principle when 
considering acts which create human life, there is no clear formula for how this principle 
should be applied. How do we determine what is best for a child born as a result of assisted 
reproduction?23 If children born from assisted reproductive procedures do feel a degree of 
uneasiness about the acts which created them, or parental expectations on them are heightened 
as a result of their selection at an embryonic stage of development, is this reason enough to 
propose a restriction on parental freedom to use reproductive technology in this way? 
While these concerns have been raised in the literature, there is no general agreement as to 
how they should be addressed. These highly complex problems surrounding our obligations 
to future persons have been termed ‘genesis’ problems by some philosophers, meaning those 
problems relating to decisions regarding the existence, number, and identity of future people. 
This category of problem is unique in philosophy because our traditional ethical analysis and 
moral intuitions both lead us to paradoxical solutions (or else break down altogether) when 
applied to questions about the creation of human life.24 The question of whether we can harm 
future people by bringing them into existence is one of those problems that has received a 
great deal of the philosophical attention.25 For now, it suffices to say that the welfare of the 
child principle introduces new complexities to these genesis problems, rather than offering a 
water-tight solution.26 
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5  social iMPact oF genetic cHoices
The public is increasingly concerned about the prospect of genetic technology being used 
by parents to choose their offspring.27 The term ‘designer babies’ is used prominently in the 
media to refer to these acts of selection. In truth, rather than designing their children, parents 
using genetic analysis are selecting or rejecting an embryo or fetus, based on its pre-existing 
genetic makeup. It is this process of selection and rejection that is not encapsulated with the 
controversial term ‘designer babies’ and which is, in some ways, more worrying than the term 
‘designer’ would indicate. 
Public opinion surveys indicate that there is some level of concern in society that genetic 
developments will one day give parents too much power to ‘choose’ their offspring. One view 
that has emerged is that while it is generally felt to be appropriate to use genetic technology 
to test for ‘severe conditions’, certain uses of genetic testing are inappropriate. Most concerns 
focus on those technologies which aim to avoid the birth of children with certain characteristics 
or to make ‘perfect’ people.28 Clear areas where some members of the public feel that testing 
should not be undertaken are in relation to tests for ‘sex, physical characteristics such as eye 
colour or ‘looks’, skills, and non-health related attributes in general’.29 
These views raise special ethical concerns. While consultation can inform on a spectrum 
of beliefs, it is still unclear to what extent the ethical concerns expressed by some groups in 
society should be accepted as a reason for restraining the freedom of others to use technology 
in ways they desire. How important are the views of the public in formulating policy? How, if 
at all, should these concerns expressed by some groups in society be translated into law? There 
are no clear answers to these questions. Two prominent, but conflicting, views seem to emerge. 
In terms of the ‘majoritarian’ approach, the group which is successful at achieving the ‘balance 
of power’ forces its values on others, although there is still reasonable disagreement with those 
values in society.30  While this may seem to express a description of democracy, McCarthy 
continues that a better approach in a pluralistic society is ‘to have a society in which value 
disputes are resolved in a way in which no one can reasonably reject.’31
The social impact of genetic choices
Some members of the public fear that the new genetic technologies will have eugenic 
implications. The terms eugenics has had multiple meanings over time, but is generally 
taken to mean ‘well born’, a literal interpretation of the term which was first coined by Sir 
Francis Galton in 1883. The new genetic technologies may have potential eugenic uses, 
but this does not mean they are morally questionable per se. Genetic choices today about 
offspring are not imposed through a State imposed blueprint or enforced sterilisation 
of the ‘unfit’ (indicia of past applications of eugenics), but they may raise new moral 
concerns. Ongoing research needs to be undertaken into the long-term effects of using 
genetic data to make reproductive choices. Continued surveillance should be undertaken 
as to what impact these technologies will have on those who are already living with the 
conditions for which testing is offered. Attitudes towards people with disabilities in 
society should be carefully monitored, and mechanisms established to ensure testing 
(aimed at avoiding the birth of children with some genetic disorders) does not result in a 
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change in attitude towards those in society who are living with these conditions. Publicly 
funded programmes aimed at reducing the incidence of genetic disease should be offered 
in tandem with public education programmes about disability. These programmes should 
work towards the elimination of prejudice in society against disabled persons, promote a 
better awareness of life with disability, and establish better relations between the disabled 
and society, than at present.
To what extent ethical concerns raised by new genetic technologies are incorporated into the 
law is a political decision that law and policy makers must make, with reference to the ethical 
values of the society in which they operate. A thorough analysis of this ethical problem is 
outside the scope of this part of the report.  However, subsequent parts deal with matters 
which touch on the central question of how ethical disagreement should be dealt with at a 
policy level.
6  eugenics
Among the fears associated with the potential new uses of technology is the concern that 
genetic testing may lead to a new form of eugenics. Eugenics, a term which has developed 
multiple meanings over the years, is generally taken to mean ‘well born’, a literal interpretation 
of the term which was first coined by Sir Francis Galton in 1883. Eugenics was defined by 
Galton as ‘the science of improving stock, not only by judicious mating, but by whatever tends 
to give the more suitable races or strains of blood, a better chance of prevailing over the less 
suitable’.32 
The application of eugenics ideology into practice has a chequered history. Eugenics, as 
practised in Nazi Germany, is perhaps the best known application, and one which raises the 
spectre of such horrific abuses of fundamental human rights that it is clear why those who 
see the benefit in current genetic technology seek to distance what can be achieved today 
through genetics from these past abuses. Nazi eugenics involved the sterilisation of significant 
numbers of people considered ‘unfit’ to reproduce and the killing of disabled children and 
adults. The history of the Nazi euthanasia programme is complex but what is evident today is 
that many people still link eugenics as practised in the past with current clinical applications 
of genetics.33  
Some members of the public, for example, when asked the question what springs to mind when 
they hear ‘genetics’, spontaneously associated genetics with ‘trying to create a super race’ and 
‘Hitler’.34 Consultation directed specifically at PGD reveals eugenics as an area of concern for 
some members of the public. Surveys conducted in the United States reveal some respondents 
strongly feel that restrictions should be placed on the freedom of parents to use genetics in the 
context of reproduction, with around half of some groups in some cases indicating eugenics as 
their ‘top concern when asked about the possible harmful effects of reproductive testing’.35  
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Why should the link be made between current clinical applications of genetics and eugenics? 
Some people, particularly many disabled people, fear that the ‘medical surveillance of 
reproduction’ made possible by new genetic technologies will continue the eugenic practices 
of the early 20th century.36 The term ‘consumer eugenics’ has been coined to refer to this new 
form of eugenics.37 There are, however, clear differences between how genetics is used now, and 
past uses and abuses of genetics. As Julian Savulescu argues ‘[w]hat was wrong with the Nazi 
eugenic programme was that the State imposed a blueprint of perfection on couples seeking 
to have children by forcing sterilisation of the ‘unfit’ and removed their reproductive freedom’. 
This separation of state control from individual desire was tacitly accepted in the UK by the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in its report Human Reproductive 
Technologies and the Law (2005). It stated that in its opinion ‘[i]f ensuring that your child is less 
likely to face a debilitating disease in the course of their life can be termed eugenics, we have 
no problem with its use. State programmes that impose a genetic blueprint are another matter. 
They should be outlawed as part of any regulation of assisted reproduction. Use of the word 
eugenics must not be used as an emotive term of abuse to obscure rational debate’.38
It may be the case that most fears of eugenics are unfounded, based as they are on an unrealistic 
expectation of what can be achieved through genetic technology. In the view of the Human 
Genetics Commission in the UK, ‘[t]he anxiety that PGD lies at the top of a slippery slope 
leading to the possibility of a wide range of potential enhancements, such as intelligence or 
beauty, is misplaced’.39 Enhancements which some people fear may give rise to a ‘designer baby’ 
(such as beauty, intelligence, personality) will involve a large number of genes which interact 
in complex ways with each other and the environment.40 Given that there is a limited number 
of embryos for implantation, it is highly unlikely that it would be possible to select for one 
combination of gene variants over the other. In the view of the Human Genetics Commission, 
‘[t]he hope of making a designer baby is fanciful’.41  In any event, there is an ethical distinction 
to be drawn between state-enforced selection and the individual choices of a small number of 
intending parents.
  PersPectives oF PeoPle witH DisaBilities
One of the most forceful critiques of the use of genetics comes from people with disabilities. 
The disability rights critique of genetics is founded on a view of disability that sees it as not 
purely a medical construct, but also a political and social one.42 It argues that while the medical 
profession sees genetics as a major contribution to human health and a way of avoiding 
suffering connected with impairment genetics when used to allow parents to avoid the birth of 
children with disabilities, some forms of disability are unfairly singled out as undesirable and 
therefore appropriate for testing.
Some disability rights advocates argue that prenatal testing followed by selective abortion 
expresses a ‘hurtful attitude about and send[s] a hurtful message to people who live with those 
same traits’.43 According to Adrienne Asch, ‘with prenatal diagnosis, a single trait stands in for 
the whole, the trait obliterates the whole…The tests send the message that there’s no need 
to find out about the rest.’44  This argument is referred to in the writings as the ‘expressivist 
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argument’. The personal impact of these decisions to avoid the birth of children with disabilities 
is one that is acutely felt by many in the disability community. One writer explains the personal 
impact of this feeling of being non-valued by society in the following way: 
The message at the heart of widespread selective abortion on the basis of prenatal 
diagnosis is the greatest insult; some of us are “too flawed” in our very DNA to exist; we 
are unworthy of being born…45 
These views lead some disability rights activists to be cautious about how we should use 
information about genetic links to disease and disability gained from the Human Genome 
Project. Some fear it ‘will enable doctors to conduct a ‘search and destroy’ mission against 
the disabled people on behalf of society’.46 Others warn that if a couple refuses testing for 
some conditions, and subsequently has a child with the condition, this news will no longer be 
‘considered a tragic surprise or shock’, but an ‘example of wilful and deliberate ignorance’.47 The 
disability rights critique of genetics challenges the assumption that there is a correct response 
(i.e. abortion) when a woman finds that she is carrying a fetus that has a genetic condition. 
Advocates such as Marsha Saxton argue that ‘…the current promotion and application of 
prenatal screening has a potent message that negatively affects people with disabilities, 
influences women in decision-making about their pregnancies, and reinforces the general 
public’s stereotyped attitudes about people with disabilities’.48 
For disabled women, reproductive rights encompass not just the right to contraception and 
abortion, but broader themes such as the right to bear and raise children.49 In their exploration 
of what reproductive rights means for disabled women, Kallianes and Rubenfeld argue 
that whereas ‘normal’ women are expected to marry and have children, a double standard 
exists for disabled women who are seen as ’‘defective’ and undesirable as sexual partners or 
mothers.50 They assert that disabled women have been subjected to a process under which 
they are discouraged from childbearing, forced to undergo abortions or sterilisations, and 
have lost control of their children.51 Kallianes and Rubenfeld argue that disabled women view 
reproductive rights as ‘more than the right to choose not to have a child; the concept also 
encompasses the right to be recognised as sexual, to bear children – even a disabled child – to 
be seen as ‘fit’ to mother and to refuse the use of genetic technologies.’52 
Embodied in many articles on the subject of disabled women’s rights to reproduction are 
the personal experiences of disabled women. These writings are rich with the experiences of 
women and the pressures they experienced (from doctors, their parents and spouses) not to 
have children.53 One of the most vivid narratives is provided by Deborah Kent, who describes 
the ‘chasm’ she discovered between herself and her husband and parents regarding her blindness 
when she contemplated having children.54 She contrasts her views of blindness as a ‘neutral 
characteristic’ with those of her husband and parents, who viewed blindness as fundamentally 
undesirable. The fear that her husband felt at the prospect of having a child who was blind (a 
fear not shared by Kent) was only alleviated after a specialist reassured him that her blindness 
was caused by an autosomal recessive condition and was therefore unlikely to be passed on 
to their children. Her story is a poignant reminder of how the concerns surrounding genetic 
testing are heightened in the case of women with disabilities and how important it is to ensure 
that this group of women are supported in the choices they make. It also emphasises how views 
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held by practitioners can alter a woman’s (and a couple’s) experience of genetic testing and 
how ultimately subjective the notion of risk remains.55 
A second claim emerging from the disability rights critique has more general application. 
Whereas the first claim relates primarily to how prenatal testing and PGD will alter our 
attitudes towards those with disabilities, the second claim advanced by the disability rights 
critique argues that these technologies will have significant impact on society in general. 
Disabled People International argues that this devaluing of the disabled and the ‘discriminatory 
attitudes spawned by the new genetics’ has implications for everyone, not just the disabled.56 In 
a forceful statement, Disabled People International contends that ‘the genetic goal of prevention 
and impairment by the prevention of lives judged not to be ‘normal’ is a threat to human 
diversity. It is a potential Nagasaki for everyone, not just disabled people’.57 The causal link 
between the present threat to the disability community and the potential threat to society in 
general is explained by Disabled People International as follows: 
The value of life must not be reduced to a matter of genetic inheritance. If it is allowed 
to happen no potential child will be safe from arbitrary selection. No parents will escape 
the moral burden of making impossible choices and no one will be safe from genetic 
discrimination. 58 (emphasis added) 
This assertion is related to the ‘parental attitude’ argument (outlined above) which alleges that 
prenatal testing to select against some traits indicates a ‘problematic conception of and attitude 
toward parenthood’.59 This argument is, in part, rooted in the acceptance of the assertion that 
‘the part stands in for the whole’.60 As Parens and Asch explain:
Those who connect acceptance of disability to what is desirable in any parent-child 
relationship will worry that our attitudes toward parenthood and ultimately toward each 
other are changing as a result of technologies like prenatal diagnosis. 61  
This concern has also been picked up by the President’s Council on Bioethics in its report 
Reproduction and Responsibility. In considering the impact of new biotechnologies such as 
PGD, the Council states that:
The new technologies, even when used only to screen out and eliminate the sick or ‘deficient’, 
may change parents’ attitudes toward their children, introducing both the desire to control 
and the tacit expectation of certain qualities.62    
In this way, the disability rights ‘parental attitude’ argument is linked to the wider bioethical 
concern around the changing nature of the parent/child relationship. Arguments like these 
that focus on the wider implications of genetic testing are receiving greater attention in the 
bioethics discourse. Others have argued along similar lines, alleging not only that we are all 
at risk of discrimination, but that ‘society needs people with impairments’, just as it needs 
people from different races and backgrounds.63 The British Council of Disabled People states 
that ‘[t]he new genetics not only poses a danger for disabled people. We are just the first in 
the firing line’.64 Shakespeare argues in a similar vein, asserting that ‘[w]hile genetics threatens 
to reduce the number of disabled people, in practice it expands the disability category, 
and de-stabilizes the identity of non-disabled people’.65 Shakespeare explains that the term 
‘disabled people’ is used by those within the disability movement to refer to people who ‘face 
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discrimination and prejudice, not people with illness or impairment’.66 Used in this manner, 
the term is wide enough to include within its scope people who have a genetic susceptibility or 
who are diagnosed with late-onset conditions.67 Shakespeare argues that the Human Genome 
Project teaches us that there is no perfect human genome and that the notion that a perfect 
genetic makeup exists was a ‘Platonic fallacy’.68 This ‘wider social impact’ argument (or the 
challenge that ‘we are all disabled now’)69 introduces new armoury into the disability rights 
critique. By appealing to the potential effect these technologies will have on society as a whole, 
these writers signal how present uses of genetic technology will affect all of our lives, and 
should concern the able-bodied and the disabled alike. 
Whereas the challenge that genetic technology will have implications on society is not new, the 
strength of these new challenges is that they are not rooted in some idealised view of human 
nature or the ‘unnaturalness’ of ‘playing God’, arguments that have been roundly criticised in 
the bioethics literature. Instead, they are based on the claim that all of us will lose something 
which we hold precious, namely the benefit we receive from living in a society which values 
diversity, not just of religion, race, gender, or wealth, but of physical (and mental) attributes. 
These benefits include not only what we directly gain from the contribution to society made 
by disabled persons but the value we gain indirectly from living in a society that accepts and 
values diversity. 
  conclusion
Conflicting views have emerged in relation to how far social responsibility and the fear of 
altering the fabric of society should be taken into account in policy setting. The principle of 
reproductive autonomy is an important guiding principle, but as this section has outlined, 
ethical questions continue around how far the principle extends, and to what extent the state 
should have a role in regulating reproduction. While the principle of reproductive autonomy 
unequivocally applies to require the state to respect an individual’s right to control his or her 
own body, and their choice of whether (or not) to have a child, questions continue as to how 
the principle operates in the context of the complex reproductive decisions that typify those 
arising from the merger of genetic technology and assisted reproduction.70 
Independent reproductive decisions may have wider social consequences and affect those 
outside the immediate family. This section has outlined a number of arguments that may seem 
to ‘tip-the-scales’ in favour of limiting reproductive autonomy in some circumstances. Before 
we enter the path of restricting freedom to use these new technologies for reasons of ‘social 
responsibility’, we should recall that historical analysis tells of more abuses of human rights 
and freedoms from limiting reproductive freedom than from supporting it.71 
The tension between reproductive autonomy and the state’s role in regulating reproduction 
will remain an ongoing area of examination for this project. It is a complex area that deserves 
continued surveillance. Despite ethical disagreement in relation to the extent to which 
reproductive autonomy should be restricted by state regulation of genetics, we need to affirm 
the importance of the principle in ethical discussions.  As the Human Genetics Commission 
in the UK has said: 
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Perhaps the best formulation is that whilst autonomous decision making should be 
supported and encouraged, it is legitimate to limit this autonomy where its exercise 
unreasonably impacts on the autonomy of others, or threatens others with significant 
harm. This may well be easier to state, than to apply in practice, but it is nonetheless 
worth stating.72    
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Part B:  Playing goD anD tHe genetic ManiPulation oF 
oFFsPring
1  introDuction
If you play God, play God at tennis.
A strict code of conduct is expected.
Clear lines must be drawn in the sand.
The ball will be either in or out...73
Assisted reproductive technologies are often objected to on the basis that we assume the role 
of God (or for those with fewer religious inclinations, the role of nature) when we tinker with 
reproduction and early human life.74 In the case of PGD, it is argued that to screen embryos 
with genetic tests and only implant those embryos with ‘satisfactory’ genetic make-ups is to 
be guilty of hubris – the overweening pride involved in assuming the powers of God.  The 
foundation for religious based objections to ‘playing God’ can be found in the creation stories 
of various religions, for example, the Judaeo-Christian story in Genesis, states that  God 
‘formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life’ thus 
making man ‘a living soul’  (Genesis 2:7). 
2  conservative interPretations
According to conservative religious interpretations of creation stories, because God is the 
creator of life, only He has the right to create life. Children are not human artefacts  but are 
gifts from God. Not only is God the creator of life, but He is also the governor of what we 
will be like (i.e. what our genetic make-up will be). While each human being shares certain 
common characteristics and features, each is ‘unique by the design of the Creator’75 and not a 
mere biological artefact or accidental form of life. 
The special, purposeful, and direct creation of every human being in the image of God is central 
to numerous religious worldviews.76 This requires us to carefully consider how technologies 
such as PGD define our relationship with God. Because of God’s role in the creation and 
expression of human life, conservative believers argue that tinkering with creation through 
science comprises a ‘morally culpable or hubristic transgression into the prerogatives of the 
deity’.77 When we ‘play God’ through such tinkering, we fail to honour the parameters of 
human life. 
What implication do these conservative interpretations of the creation of life have for PGD? A 
strictly conservative interpretation leads to the conclusion that interference in creation through 
PGD is an unwarranted and unauthorised interference with God’s gift of creation and should 
be prohibited. But more than that, its implication is that any form of assisted reproduction 
is intrinsically wrong. However, many religious people do not take this view. Consider, for 
example, the following. In 1987 the Catholic Church issued a statement indicating that not 
all pre-birth technology is to be opposed. In accordance with respect for the dignity of the 
human person (which, of relevance here, includes respect for the human being who is treated 
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as a person from the moment of conception), science and technology may be welcomed where 
they are at the service of the human person:
Applied biology and medicine work together for the integral good of human life when they 
come to the aid of a person stricken by illness and infirmity and when they respect his or 
her dignity as a creature of God.78 
On this approach, interventions on the human embryo that respect its life and integrity and that 
are directed towards the healing, health and survival of the embryo are acceptable in Catholic 
tradition. This would include the genetic testing of embryos where the information obtained in 
the test will be used for the benefit of the tested embryo. As Pope John Paul II said:
A strictly therapeutic intervention whose explicit objective is the healing of various 
maladies such as those stemming from chromosomal defects will, in principle, be considered 
desirable, provided it is directed to the true promotion of the personal well-being of the 
individual without doing harm to his integrity or worsening his conditions of life. Such an 
intervention would indeed fall within the logic of the Christian moral tradition.79However, 
PGD to enable parents to select genetically healthy embryos (and correspondingly select 
against genetically unhealthy embryos) is not acceptable to the Catholic Church. As noted 
in its statement, ‘no biologist or doctor can reasonably claim, by virtue of his scientific 
competence, to be able to decide on people’s origin and destiny’.80 
Accordingly, traditional Catholic interpretations are facilitative in so far as they do not close 
the door to pre-birth technology, but restrictive in that their interpretation of human roles 
in creation would be prohibitive of PGD. To engage in PGD would amount to an attempt 
to usurp the role of God and arbitrarily set oneself up as ‘the master of the destiny of others 
inasmuch as [one] arbitrarily chooses whom [one] will allow to live and whom [one] will send 
to death’.81 We should be guided by the principle that God loves each of us regardless of our 
genetic make-up and we should do likewise.82 As Ramsey says:
[God] is not a rationalist whose care is a function of indicators of our personhood, or of 
our achievement within those capacities. He makes his rain to fall upon the just and the 
unjust alike, and his sun to rise on the abnormal as well as the normal. Indeed, he has 
special care for the weak and the vulnerable among us earth people. He cares according to 
need, not capacity or merit.83
The principle that God loves us unconditionally and we should similarly love one another 
is enshrined in the Bible in 1 John 4:11 which states ’Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought 
also to love one another.’ This conservative position may seem harsh and unduly restrictive 
in the modern world. Arguments that close the door on biotechnologies aimed at improving 
health and alleviating suffering ‘tacitly bless’ a status quo that is filled with human misery 
(of which some is genetically caused).84  Accordingly, conservative Christian views as well as 




According to conservative religious interpretations of creation stories, because God is the 
creator of life, only He has the right to create life and determine what its form will be. A 
strictly conservative interpretation leads to the conclusion that interference in creation 
through PGD is an unwarranted and unauthorised interference with God’s gift of creation 
and should be prohibited. These arguments that close the door on biotechnologies aimed 
at improving health and alleviating suffering may seem harsh and unduly restrictive in 
the modern world.
3  Facilitative interPretations
An alternative interpretation of creation stories suggests that humans may have a role to play 
in creating a better world, and indeed, selecting children who will be born with a better genetic 
endowment. While the conservative interpretation of Genesis (discussed above) sees creation 
as a completed act and humans being powerless to change our environment once created by 
God, alternative interpretations see creation as a ‘transformative process’. Under this latter 
view humans can be ‘co-creators’ of the world in which we live.  
This view does not foreclose us being seen as participants in the act of creating with God, and 
indeed working in partnership with God – a view associated with Jewish and Islamic traditions.85 
The ‘partnership’ model provides that God has given humans a positive commandment to 
master the world. On this view, ‘to ̀ work’ nature is to improve it to meet human needs, and this 
activity is both right and obligatory ‘as long as we preserve nature’.86 As such, it is permissible to 
intervene in nature for human well-being, including intervening with embryonic development 
to improve human health. The co-creator model provides that as co-creators, humans acquire 
and implement knowledge to improve humanity and have an important creative role in the 
shaping of God’s world.
If we accept the ‘co-creator’ model, the real issue lies not in whether we allow such technologies 
as PGD to proceed, but whether we use the technologies for good or evil – the moral valence of 
such technologies lies on how we use them to fulfil God’s creative design. The question then is: 
how do we know whether PGD is ‘good’ and should be utilised to realise God’s creative design? 
Hughson argues that the view our role in artificial reproduction as creation in cooperation 
with God (with an awareness of divine direction to guide our work) avoids dominating and 
exploitative applications of reproductive biotechnologies that might otherwise occur. Protestant 
theologian, Verhey, has noted that ‘human creativity is given with the creation. Human beings 
are created and called to exercise dominion in the world – and I see no reason to suppose that 
such creativity and control does not extend to genetics.’87
But what does this mean for reproductive biotechnologies and PGD? Peters’ theory that 
correlates God as creator with future interests in improving the world, and humans as the 
created co-creator orients us to working to make our future better. We should look forward 
to the new, and our ethical guide for utilising the new should be discerned from the divine 
purpose in creating a better and more just world. We should work towards creating a future 
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that is better than the past or present. It is on this basis that Peters argues the door to germ-line 
intervention (and, by extension for the purposes of this paper, also PGD) should be kept open 
until such time as it becomes ‘convincingly clear that negative repercussions resulting from the 
technological means requires us to then close the door’.88 To seek a better future, Peters argues, 
is to ‘play human’ as God intends us to. And, in ‘playing human’ there is no theological reason 
to leave human nature unchanged.89
While this view may have implications for the way we sense God in ourselves, it does not 
necessarily have to have these implications. As noted by Cohen in the context of cloning, a co-
creator view of reproductive technologies may actually increase our awe of God, where:
Instead of viewing God as a distant Creator who formed our world long ago, perhaps we 
will see God as the Power of Creation and recognise that we too possess a share of that 
power. If asked: are we ‘playing God’ by engaging in cloning, we might reply: ‘Yes, for God 
is in us too’.90
In summary, the view that we are co-creators with God and that there is a role for us to assist 
creation through assisted reproductive technologies and PGD is not necessarily contrary to 
numerous religious traditions, including the Christian religion. Children created both of 
traditional/natural means and those of artificial means will be equally pleasing in God’s eyes.91 
Furthermore, even in the course of IVF, God remains de facto creator – it is not accurate to say 
that the reproductive specialist creates the resulting child because all he or she does is create 
conditions under which fertilisation and implantation can take place.92
More has been written of the relationship between a creative God and genetic technologies in 
the Christian tradition than in other religious systems. Some further reactions to PGD from 
this tradition therefore call for consideration, for example, a basis on which it may be argued 
that PGD is not necessarily inconsistent with Christian tradition draws on the tradition of 
God as healer.
God is compassionate and God is healer. His cause is life, not death, and human flourishing 
and health, not disease. God gave His son Jesus the power to heal as a sign that Jesus was 
doing God’s work and that he was sent by God.93 As stewards of God’s world, we should act 
as God would act in the care and treatment of the ill. Placing ourselves in the role of God the 
healer means that we must intend life and its flourishing, and not death or human suffering. 
Accordingly, where possible we should seek to alleviate suffering. The World Council of 
Churches noted when the pain of another person can be relieved or avoided, it is usually 
counted as good to do so, and failing to do so may be regarded as a moral wrong.94 As such, 
just as God gave His son Jesus the power to heal, God has given us the power to develop new 
biotechnologies to enable us to eliminate significant suffering in His world. Using that power 
to heal and alleviate suffering in a manner consistent with God’s purpose may be seen as part 
of God’s divine plan. As noted by Verhey:
There are some things which we already know how to do (and so can hardly be said 
to trespass the boundaries of human ignorance and powerlessness), but which we surely 
ought never to do. And there are some things (including some things in genetics) which 
we cannot yet do, but which we must make an effort to learn to do if… we are called to 
‘follow’ one who heals the sick and feeds the hungry.95
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What does ‘playing God’ in this Christian perspective mean for PGD? On this view one does 
not have to be accepting of suffering to be God-fearing, as our compassionate God heals and 
seeks to alleviate suffering. Instead of accepting illness as a direct chastisement by God to 
be met with resignation and repentance, we should pursue biomedical possibilities in ways 
that imitate God’s healing of human suffering. Verhey notes that ‘[g]enetic therapy, like other 
therapeutic interventions which aim at health, may be celebrated’. However, PGD does not 
involve therapeutic interventions, but rather the testing and discarding of affected embryos. 
As pointed out by Verhey, genetic diagnosis without therapeutic options is sometimes deeply 
ambiguous. Discussing prenatal diagnosis and the quandary of abortion, Verhey notes that 
there are some genetic conditions which justify abortion, such as Tay-Sachs disease and 
Trisomy 18, because those diseases are inconsistent with life and ‘subjectively indistinguishable 
from torture’. However, abortion for Down’s syndrome or sex selection would amount to 
irresponsible use prebirth diagnosis. The idea that some conditions are so severe as to warrant 
intervention, but not other conditions, is commonly advocated. However, the difficulty 
with Verhey’s analysis is that beyond the following statement he fails to provide a detailed 
justification for his conclusion:
When the slogan about ‘preventing birth defects’ is taken to justify preventing the birth 
of ‘defectives’, those who do not measure up to the standards or match the preferences of 
parents, then there are reasons to worry a little… ‘Playing God’ the way God plays God 
– or, if you will, the way God plays ‘parent’ – would sustain care for the weak and the 
helpless, and for the little ones who do not measure up …
[T]o use this knowledge and technology responsibly it must be aimed at ‘health’, not 
genetic enhancement. The distinction between intervening for health and intervening for 
genetic enhancement may be a slippery one, but casting ourselves playfully in the role of 
God the healer will encourage us to make such a distinction and to abide by it. Eugenics is 
not the way to ‘play God’ the way God plays God.96
This view gives us some useful guidance on the appropriate and acceptable limits on our use 
of this technology. Utilising PGD for therapeutic purposes (i.e. to alleviate suffering) may be 
consistent with God’s will that we ‘follow’ his lead in healing the sick. We should imitate God’s 
care for creation, and ‘[h]umans are called to pursue biomedical possibilities in ways that 
imitate God’s healing of human suffering, which are hence not purely instrumental, and are 
oriented by a concern for the poor and powerless’.97 However, the line would be drawn at PGD 
for non-therapeutic purposes as that would not be uses consistent with God’s creative design 
and care for creation.
1
Facilitative Interpretations of Creation
Another interpretation of creation stories suggests that humans may have a role to play 
in creating a better world, and indeed, selecting children who will be born with a ‘better’ 
genetic endowment. For example, while the conservative interpretation of Genesis sees 
creation as a completed act, and humans being powerless to change our environment once 
created by God, the alternative interpretations see creation as a ‘transformative process’. 
Under this later view humans can be ‘co-creaters’ of the world in which we live.  Here, the 
real issue lies not in whether we allow such technologies as PGD to proceed, but whether 
we use the technologies for good or evil. The argument then turns on whether and how 
we know that PGD is ‘good’ and should be utilised to realise God’s creative design.
4  secular versions oF tHe ‘Playing goD’ arguMent
The age of technology brings with it new knowledge and accordingly new ways of organising 
nature. The secular use of the term ‘playing God’ is concerned with objections about 
interference with nature and the natural order. Drawing on the emotive term ‘playing God’ as 
a poetic way of referring to the natural order, some observers argue that assisted reproductive 
biotechnologies are unnatural, and an unwarranted intrusion into the natural process of 
procreation. The warning not to ‘play God’ promotes a sense of reserve about the aims of 
science and its uses. The concerns tend to focus on the negative consequences of PGD, rather 
than on any intrinsic basis of PGD use.
Beyond concerns that it is unnatural to intrude into the natural process of procreation, there 
are concerns that doing so may have negative repercussions for the human race that are beyond 
our control. Thus, for example, despite our best intentions to reduce human suffering and 
enhance the quality of life through the use of genetic technologies, tinkering with genes may 
disturb biodiversity ’[d]ue to our inability to see the whole range of interconnected factors, 
we may inadvertently disturb some sort of existing balance in nature and this disturbance 
could rebound deleteriously’.98 Anxieties are expressed that scientific zeal will outpace human 
wisdom.
The questions raised in this context are: what right do we have to modify the future? What 
right do we have to predetermine future persons, and what wisdom do we have to exercise it?99 
Arguments that PGD will inevitably lead us down a slippery slope to genetic enhancement and 
the human control of evolution are often invoked to strengthen the natural order objection. 
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Secular Perspectives
It is the interference with nature and the natural order that is objected to in the secular use 
of the term ‘playing God’. Drawing on the emotive term ‘playing God’ as a poetic way of 
referring to the natural order, observers argue that assisted reproductive biotechnologies 
are unnatural, and an unwarranted intrusion into the natural process of procreation. The 
warning not to ‘play God’ promotes a sense of reserve about the aims of science and its 
uses. It is through a focus on the negative consequences of PGD, rather than any intrinsic 
basis, that PGD is regarded as morally wrong on this approach. Arguments that PGD will 
inevitably lead us down a slippery slope to genetic enhancement and the human control 
of evolution are often invoked to strengthen the natural order objection.
4.1  unwarranteD interFerence witH tHe natural orDer
As with the Christian versions of the ‘Playing God’ arguments, there are variations in perspectives 
about whether or on what basis PGD constitutes an unwarranted interference with the natural 
order. Conservative-based observers argue that genetic interventions represent an unwarranted 
human meddling in a biological order that is delicate and self-sustaining. As noted by Grey, 
biological processes and products have evolved over billion-year geological time scales and 
have thereby proved their robustness.100 Natural life-forms come with the quality assurance of 
exceptionally prolonged testing under the most searching conditions. ‘Nature knows best’ and 
that is evidenced, for example, through natural selection and immunity to disease – who are 
we to assume power to interfere with natural structures developed over such significant time 
periods? Those who propose radical alterations in the gene pool through human reproductive 
technologies do not know for certain whether the benefits of those technologies will outweigh 
what are as yet unknown risks. By the time any negative consequences of such ‘tinkering’ 
become known, it may be too late and our children will already have been harmed, and ‘the 
institutions at issue irretrievably altered’.101 McGee argues that ‘[t]he ‘only certainty’ of this 
endeavour is ‘the impoverishment of the genetic stock.’102 Concerns such as this have been 
expressed against scientific progress and development, yet there may in fact be no risks or the 
level of any risk may be deemed acceptable by society.
Another basis for the argument that PGD is an unwarranted interference in the natural 
order rests on the effects that selecting against embryos with certain genotypes will have 
on biodiversity. The basis for this objection is that changes in genetic diversity (variation at 
the level of individual genes) will necessarily result in a loss of biodiversity.103 Biodiversity is 
important because it allows the population to survive particular environmental challenges. 
In the context of health, genetic diversity is believed to confer the capacity to resist damage 
and disease,104 for example, sufferers of sickle-cell anaemia (a painful, debilitating, and life-
shortening rare genetic blood disorder, principally found in black populations in Africa or in 
populations of African descent in other parts of the world) seem to have a higher resistance to 
malaria. Sickle-cell anaemia is thought potentially to be a compensating genetic advantage.
Because of the role of biodiversity in naturally regulating the environment in which we live, 
it is argued that ‘it is in our best interests to monitor and preserve that diversity.’105 In the case 
of genetic diseases such as sickle cell anaemia, the concern is that if we screen out embryos 
11
with the disease, we risk losing what may prove to be a valuable genetic resource (resistance 
to malaria in the case of sickle-cell anemia).106 To appreciate biodiversity requires us to take 
care to ensure we do not reduce biodiversity through tinkering with the gene pool. The 
counterargument is that genetic engineering of a kind has been practised by selective breeding 
in animals (including humans), horticulture and agriculture for thousands of years.107 With 
selective breeding we have, throughout history, interfered with biodiversity. Furthermore, from 
a population genetics perspective, impacts on biodiversity through PGD will be negligible. 
As noted by Harris, ‘[e]ven deleting one or two, or even ten or twenty defective genes in 
one individual or altering the same number of base pairs is not going to make a significant 
contribution to either genetic diversity or human diversity or lack of diversity.’108
Observers who believe PGD represents an unwarranted interference in the natural order often 
invoke concerns about the slippery slope and eugenics to support their argument. Concerns 
about eugenics and the slippery slope are not new in discussions about assisted reproductive 
biotechnologies. The concerns highlighted in the PGD context is that if we allow PGD to 
proceed, the doors to racial purity, increased economic efficiency, better performance standards 
and enhancement in the quality of life will be opened. This will lead to societal inequalities 
and an overemphasis on increased efficiency, where the ‘‘good’ is defined as engineering life to 
improve performance.’109 Cries of ‘holocaust’ abound, as do concerns that with each additional 
diagnostic test we move further down a slippery slope to trading away our humanity.
The essence of the concern is not that there may be very beneficial and worthwhile uses of the 
technology but that a line will never be able to be drawn between positive and negative selection, 
or between PGD for therapeutic or healing purposes and PGD for social purposes aimed at 
enhancement. Once we separate the biological and personal dimensions of procreation, it is 
argued, there are no limits to the possibilities for recombination; that designer babies are not 
merely the subject of science fiction but the ‘logical outcome of making reproduction a union 
of intentions rather than of bodies’.110 
Bagaric, in responding to the slippery slope argument to eugenics, noted that there is ‘strong 
evidence that the values and beliefs which created the culture in which misguided eugenic 
practices led to large-scale abuses of fundamental human interests have largely disappeared 
from the human psyche.’111 Society has come a long way since the atrocities of the holocaust. 
The current international environment is one of a strong level of disapprobation towards 
racism and elitism, and a genuine commitment to human rights and the equal moral worth 
of all individuals. As such, Bagaric argues that ‘eugenics is no different to many discoveries, 
such as splitting the atom - it can be used for good or bad’.112 What we need to concentrate 
on is not prohibiting eugenics but paying attention to the moral and legal environment in 
which it is practised. Echoing some Christian observers, the question is not whether we should 
‘play God’ but whether we will ‘play God’ responsibly. An awareness of the concern that new 
reproductive biotechnologies such as PGD could ‘deepen the temptations of science toward an 
inappropriate domination of nature’113 can help us recognise the need to ‘play God’ carefully 
to mitigate against the risk of that feared outcome. Restrictive secular ‘playing God’ arguments 
are somewhat unconvincing. However, it is important to note that underlying these objections 
is a sense of intuitive discomfort with using PGD technology to manipulate who we allow to 
be born. This objection perhaps provides an indication more for education than prohibition 
or heavy restriction.
12
4.2  DesiraBle interFerence witH tHe natural orDer
At the other end of the spectrum, some observers argue that although PGD may amount to 
interference in the natural order, such interference is not unwarranted but desirable. It can be 
argued that nature does not know best, and observers question why we should wait several 
billion years for evolution to take its course when it is within our power to make rapid and 
radical desirable changes through genetic technology.114 It is argued that the natural order 
and natural processes have no dignity of their own, ‘their value is reduced to their utility to 
humanity – and nature does not serve humanity ‘naturally’’.115 Verhey notes:
Nature threatens to rule and to ruin humanity. Against the powers of nature, knowledge 
promises the power to relieve humanity’s miseries and ‘to endow the human family with 
new mercies’ … The fault that runs through our world and through our lives must finally 
be located in nature. Nature may be - and must be - mastered.116 
On this view, the reality of the limited effects on biodiversity and the significant benefits that 
can be attained through the utilisation of this technology provide that any risk of interference 
in the natural order is worth taking. In fact, it is desirable and for some, morally obligatory, that 
we engage in PGD to improve our gene pool. As is to be expected, there is also a ‘middle path’ 
approach to the secular ‘playing God’ objection. The ‘middle path’ approach recognises the 
concerns expressed by conservative observers but holds that these concerns are not a sufficient 
reason to curb the use of technology. As Clark says, the ‘middle path’ approach promotes 
‘careful biotechnological stewardship’117 and would have us ‘move forward with caution into 
genomic research and with insights from valued traditions as to the proper purposes and uses 
of new knowledge’.118 On this view there is no deep moral objection to our ‘playing God’ so 
long as we ‘play God’ carefully. We must shape the ends we seek by channelling the use of 
biotechnology in humane, not monstrous, directions.119 
In many instances in medicine, we already ‘play God’ and the further question is not whether 
we should ‘play God’ but what sorts of local ‘Gods’ we will or should become.120 
5  conclusion
So how do we make sense of the ‘playing God’ objection when considering the permissibility 
and limits of PGD? We can ask ourselves whether there is an all-encompassing interpretation 
of the phrase that is useful to guide decision-making about the use of human powers in the 
context of PGD. The answer seems to be no. The President’s Commission (United States) 
attempted to make sense of the phrase by stating that the phrase does not have ‘a specific 
religious meaning’ but rather that at its heart, the phrase was ‘an expression of a sense of awe 
[in response to extraordinary human powers] and concern [about the possible consequences 
of these vast new powers]’.121 As noted by Verhey, in this respect the Commission simply 
‘translated the warnings against ‘playing God’ into a concern about the consequences of 
exercising great human powers’. In doing so, the Commission reduced the phrase to secular 
terms, making God superfluous. The conclusion that the phrase ‘playing God’ would have 
nothing to do with God at all is difficult to fathom, and is unlikely to sit comfortably with 
those who advocate this objection by drawing inspiration from religious texts.
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‘Playing God’ means different things to different people and it is not possible to adopt an 
interpretation of the phrase that would encompass varying applications of the term and 
from which principles for guiding action can be drawn. We can only go so far to say that the 
phrase is a useful way to describe generic concerns about overstepping human boundaries, 
whether those concerns are based on religious or secular beliefs. The debate in this area reveals 
perspectives about the appropriate limits of human action.122 ‘Playing God’ objections require 
us to consider very carefully the implications and limits of what we are doing and to reflect 
closely our policies on PGD. Indeed, this is a view recognised by several observers. Ryan argues 
that while no interpretations of the phrase ‘playing God’ tend to be persuasive, warnings not 
to ‘play God’ have an important parenetic function, ‘occasioning needed reflection on the 
meaning of creatureliness, finitude and responsible co-creation in the context of new forms 
of reproduction.’123 She states that ‘playing God’ objections are persistent and rhetorically 
powerful because of the immense importance of the questions they raise and that ‘[t]aken 
seriously, they challenge us to articulate the right relationship between divine authority and 
human responsibility in reproduction; they force us to discern the meaning of creatureliness 
and co-creativity under new circumstances.’124 In other words:
[W]e can disagree on the conditions under which medicine ceases serving and begins 
violating those parameters or breaching those obligations. Still, the warning that there are 
some things we ought not do continues to surface and garner support precisely because 
of the importance of what it seeks to preserve: a sense of boundaries drawn by respect for 
offspring as human persons, the character of parenthood as a reproductive trust, and the 
natural limits of our bodily and psychic natures.125
In the New Zealand context, the New Zealand Interchurch Commission on Genetic Engineering 
stated:
There is a sense that we have an awesome responsibility on account of the power we have 
fashioned for ourselves… but we need to curb our natural hubris in this area and think of 
the awe with which we should approach a delicate balance which has been slowly evolving 
to its present state since before recorded time. We are not the autonomous masters of a 
world which belongs to us for our exclusive use. Rather, we are the inheritors of something 
that we have received as a previous gift in which many interwoven forces are bound up. 
We must be responsible in the use of the power we have and not get led astray by what 
seems a good idea at present, unless we understand significantly what its impact on our 
inheritance will be. To do less is to be negligent with a trust which we hold from all those 
who have gone before and for all those who will follow us.126
In short, in the absence of an all-encompassing definition or constructive principles, what we 
can conclusively say about the ‘playing God’ objection is that it brings to the analysis a sense 
of limits. The objection initiates reflection on the necessity of boundaries and a framework to 
distinguish when reproductive medicine is used for ‘assisting the courageous effort to conceive’ 
from when it used for `encouraging self-abuse’.127
As is evidenced by the range of views and interpretations of religious stories of creation 
and the role of humans in creation, it is difficult to argue conclusively that the ‘playing God’ 
objection provides a basis for arguing that PGD is either wrong intrinsically or wrong because 
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of the bad consequences. The analysis of religious viewpoints shows it will be no easy task for 
policy-makers to extract constructive principles that would help draw boundaries, and the 
task would not be made any simpler by adding the varieties of perspectives of secular versions 
of ‘Playing God’ to the mix. What can be concluded is that the phrase ‘playing God’ does not 
just mean one thing; it means different things to different people in different contexts,128 and it 
sets different limits on the acceptable exercise of human powers for different people. 
At the beginning of this section of the report a stanza from a poem by Colquhoun was cited. The 
stanza suggested that if we agree to play God, we should do so only within strict boundaries. 
We should play God in a way rather as we would in a tennis court where we will know whether 
the ‘ball’ is in or out. However, it will not always be easy to tell where the boundaries should lie. 
A specific use of PGD will not always be clearly ‘in or out’. We need to engage in constant and 
careful reflection and discussion about the appropriate limits to the way in which we PGD.
Making Sense of the ‘Playing God’ Objection
It is difficult to argue conclusively that the ‘playing God’ objection provides a basis for 
arguing that PGD is either intrinsically wrong or wrong due to the bad consequences it 
may lead to. Because ‘playing God’ means different things to different people, it is not 
possible to adopt a single interpretation of the phrase to draw principles for guiding 
action. ‘Playing God’ objections require us to consider the implications and limits of what 
we are doing very carefully, and to have true regard for concerns about boundary crossing 
in any PGD policy we adopt.
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Part c:  PreiMPlantation genetic Diagnosis anD tHe Moral 
status oF tHe eMBryo
1  introDuction
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) was initially welcomed by some as a more acceptable 
alternative to prenatal testing because PGD involves screening embryos prior to implantation. 
PGD allows parents wishing to avoid the birth of children with certain genetic disorders to 
select one embryo over another, implanting only those which testing reveal do not have the 
genetic disorder.  Hence, PGD substantially minimises or avoids the need for abortion.  For this 
reason, it is seen in some cases to be less morally troubling than prenatal testing. PGD does, 
however, raise concerns in relation to the moral status of the embryo because it necessarily 
involves the destruction of embryos with genetic disorders. 
Those who believe that the embryo is a moral being with a right to life argue that it is never 
permissible to destroy an embryo, and therefore that assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
is unacceptable. For others, the options PGD gives to prospective parents to take control of 
their reproductive decision-making outweighs the claim that the embryo has moral status 
and a right to life. The question is when, if ever, would creating and discarding an embryo be 
considered acceptable or justified. 
There is no easy answer to this question. An examination of the debate about the moral status 
of the embryo uncovers a diversity of views and that it is an issue that society has constantly 
grappled with since the advent of in vitro fertilisation (IVF).  The aim of this section of the 
report is to examine the debate on the moral status of the embryo in order to inform policy 
on the acceptable limits of PGD in New Zealand.  What will be revealed is that there are many 
conflicting views and the debate is not easily resolved. Nevertheless, for policy purposes, it is 
necessary to move forward in spite of a lack of consensus on the moral status of the embryo.
2  tHe range oF views
The differing views about the moral status of the embryo in the following discussion will be 
broadly categorised as falling under three headings: the liberal, moderate and conservative 
views.
The conservative view states that the embryo has full moral status and deserves full moral 
respect. Although most conservatives welcome medical and scientific advances that promote 
health and alleviate suffering, those advances are not tolerated at the expense of fundamental 
moral values. According to the conservative view, PGD is unethical – respect for the embryo 
on the basis of moral status rules out discriminating against embryos on the basis of health or 
disability because embryo selection implicitly and explicitly devalues life that is already weak 
and marginalised. Allowing embryo selection for any reason, including for reasons related 
to the health of the child to be born, may open the way to significant pressure for eugenic or 
discriminatory activity.129 
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The ramifications of accepting the conservative view would be that the potential benefits of 
PGD (for example, to help infertile couples with genetic disorders to have healthy children) 
will not be realised – prospective parents would not have the choice to screen and select 
embryos on the basis of the genetic make-up of embryos. Whilst banning PGD would mean 
that embryos would not be destroyed or discarded on the basis of their genetic make-up, 
standard IVF processes create more embryos than necessary for implantation with the result 
that ‘spare’ embryos would likely perish anyway.
The liberal position takes the opposite view – the embryo has no moral status.  It has no claim 
to a right to life and can be discarded or used  for any purpose. If this view is accepted, PGD 
would be permissible in New Zealand not only in its current form but also for social or ‘trivial’ 
reasons. The wide availability and use of PGD technology would have positive consequences for 
prospective parents with genetic disorders to have ‘healthy’ children and for relieving children 
from painful suffering due to incurable and seriously disabling disease. However, arguments 
have been made that there may be negative consequences for society if PGD is allowed to 
proceed under a liberal umbrella, for example, the impact on the parent/child relationship and 
greater discrimination in the disability sector.
The moderate view, as the name suggests, lies somewhere between the two extremes. There 
are two different moderate perspectives – that the embryo gains moral status at a specific time 
between fertilisation and birth, or that the development of personhood is a gradual process 
and, as the unborn entity develops, it is accorded greater moral status and right to life.  The 
moderate view maintains that the embryo deserves ‘special respect’ on account of a weak 
moral status and the embryo can be created, used and discarded for legitimate reasons where 
the benefits of the proposed use outweigh the embryo’s weak moral status. Robertson refers to 
this view as ‘modern traditionalism’ – the view is modern in its acceptance of new technologies 
yet traditional in demanding that those techniques ordinarily serve traditional reproductive 
goals.130
The New Zealand Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 (HART Act) rejects 
both the conservative and liberal views, and adopts the moderate view. PGD is permitted to 
proceed subject to certain constraints that connect it with reproduction and the absence of 
direct harm to offspring, families, women, society and others. This approach is similar to that 
adopted in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom in the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990.131
3  tHe etHical arguMents
There are several ethical theories underpinning the different views of the status of the embryo 
and what is or is not permissible to do. The following sections examine arguments based on 
a number of theories to determine whether any of them provide a convincing basis for policy 
on the acceptable limits of PGD in New Zealand.
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3.1  rigHts-BaseD arguMents132
Rights-based theorists use the well-established moral principle that the intentional killing of 
innocent persons is morally impermissible to argue that the key to the controversy lies in 
determining whether the embryo is a person. However, serious disagreement exists as to what 
constitutes a ‘person’ and at what stage of development the embryo becomes a ‘person’.
Some rights-based arguments rely on biological definitions of development. In line with 
the principle that the intentional killing of innocent persons is morally impermissible, the 
protagonists in this debate look for a point of time in human biological development at which 
one can hold that the unborn entity is a person. As soon as it can be regarded as a person, it is 
morally impermissible to destroy it. While there is general agreement on the facts of embryonic 
development,133 there is disagreement as to which facts are ‘morally relevant’.
The conservative view relies on two particular claims. The first is that from the very beginning, 
the human zygote is an individual human life. The second is that although science alone cannot 
determine the point at which ‘personhood’ begins, recent scientific findings does indicate that 
human life is a continuum from fertilisation, and the resulting entity must therefore be treated 
and respected as a person.134 
The liberal view maintains that the conservative premise makes no sense, because calling an 
embryo a human being is as false as looking at an acorn and calling it an oak tree.135 Rather, 
the liberal argues, the biological facts of human development indicate that moral significance 
should attach at a much later stage in development: viability, birth, or for extreme liberals, 
even after birth.136 Before that time, the zygote or embryo is too rudimentary in structure 
and development to be a member of the moral community and to be accorded moral rights, 
including a right to life. As such, for the liberal there can be no moral objection to destroying 
or discarding embryos.137 
Those with moderate views who point to facts of biological development as the theory 
underlying their view argue that moral respect due to the pre-born human increases as it 
develops. Significant stages of development include key points in time, for example, at 
implantation, the attainment of human form, the achievement of the ability to move about 
spontaneously or quickening, the onset of brain activity, or the capacity to feel pain.138
Do any of these approaches to the moral status of the embryo provide a convincing view of 
the limits we should place on PGD in New Zealand? The answer is no.  The conservative view 
is reliant on the supposition that from fertilisation, the human zygote is an individual human 
life. Whilst the embryo is living, and genetically unique, it is not an ‘individual’ in the sense 
in which a person is an individual.139 At the point of fertilisation, the zygote is totipotent. 
This means that each cell of the zygote maintains the potential to divide and develop into 
a completely separate entity, which is what happens when identical twins are formed. Until 
the cells of the pre-embryo are ‘restricted’ in the course of their development, so as to be 
differentiated toward particular developmental outcomes in the one entity, it cannot be 
established that a human ‘individual exists’ – the zygote or pre-embryo is still potentially at 
least a pair of identical twins.140 
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The conservative response is that regardless of the zygote’s totipotentiality, it is still a unified, 
self-directed human organism,141 and the rare possibilities of twinning and fusion do not 
overturn the understanding that the pre-embryo itself is a single living human being composed 
of interdependent and unrelated cells, which operate under the direction of an overarching 
plan. It is the biological unity, not the scientific individuality, of the zygote that renders it a 
morally protectable human being. Opponents would argue that the conservative’s claim is 
not supported by science, as there is no evidence that the zygote is unified in its function or 
has ‘biological unity’. Whilst the biological norm may well be that twinning and fusion are 
rare, the biological norm does not provide that the zygote is a human person or individual, it 
only provides a reason for acting as if it were, which is different.142 However, the fact that the 
embryo may yet be two persons rather than one person should be reason enough, it can be 
argued, to accord it even greater moral status.
Moving back from the science to the fundamental basis for many conservative views – that 
reproduction is a ‘gift’ from God or nature and that the resulting entity should be unconditionally 
cherished – also does not assist the conservative argument. This argument finds its roots in 
religious- and metaphysical-based views of reproduction – a view which many would not 
share. The argument has such breadth that it would render nearly all forms of technological 
assistance in reproduction objectionable regardless of the natural fact that people have strong 
interests in passing on their genes and having healthy offspring, and regardless of the fact that 
using this technology to accomplish that task is no more objectionable than using technology 
after birth to enable survival to continue.143
Rejection of the conservative view does not necessarily lead to acceptance of the liberal view. 
As with the conservative view, some protagonists believe that science does not support the 
liberal view that the embryo is too rudimentary in structure to be a person and therefore 
does not become a person until a much later stage in development. The moderate view is also 
problematic. If moral status is rightfully accorded at some stage between fertilisation and birth, 
what is the significant stage? Our knowledge of the biological facts of human development 
provide that the significant stage cannot be implantation – although implantation results in 
a pre-embryo as a developmentally single individual, developmental singleness is not limited 
to the human species and therefore is not, in itself, enough to establish the moral status of the 
pre-embryo.144 
What becomes evident is that a rights-based approach based on facts of biological development 
is unhelpful. The debate does not help us determine whether the embryo has moral status 
that is harmed by intervention or destruction in the course of PGD, and provides even less 
guidance on what the acceptable limits on PGD should be. None of the three rights-based 
views establish there is one point at which the unborn entity can be accorded moral status and 
a right to life. 
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3.2  Deontological arguMents
Different moral duties have been promoted as providing the foundation for what the embryo 
is and how we should treat it. One such moral duty is the duty not to harm innocent persons 
– a duty which is breached if we intentionally harm another. The question as to whether the 
embryo is a ‘person’ to which this moral duty applies is open to debate. If the embryo is a 
‘person’, the possibility of its destruction in the course of IVF (whether or not with PGD) 
is likely to breach the moral duty not to harm innocent persons and therefore be morally 
impermissible. However, whether or not the embryo is a ‘person’ cannot be resolved and, in 
this respect, the deontologist theory encounters similar problems as a rights-based approach.
In response to the difficulty with definitions of ‘personhood’, some deontologists claim that an 
embryo should be respected because it has the potential to develop into a being that deserves 
respect in its own right, not necessarily because it does or does not fit a rigid list of criteria. 
It is the embryo’s potential to become a person that gives it moral status and a right to life. 
Potentiality is determined at conception and accordingly, from that point on, the embryo 
should be treated as a person.145 This is a popular argument but it is also problematic.
The prospective limits of ‘potential’ are undefined – all that can be said about the potential of a 
pre-embryo can also be said about the potential of human gametes. Does this therefore mean 
that gametes have moral status and the use of contraception is immoral?146  This would seem 
an illogical conclusion, because neither sperm or egg, by itself, can become a human being, just 
as an atom of sodium or chlorine could not by itself properly be called salt.147
Buckle, who argues that the deontological ‘potentiality’ argument does not provide a basis 
for the moral status of the embryo, distinguishes two senses of potentiality – the potential to 
become and the potential to produce.148 The potential to become is evident only in an entity 
that maintains its identity over time. However, the potential to produce does not provide that 
any form of identity in the entity be maintained, for example, hydrogen and oxygen have the 
potential to produce water.149 While the embryo has the potential to produce a self-conscious 
entity, it lacks the potential to become a self-conscious individual, and the embryo’s potential 
to produce a self-conscious entity is not grounds for saying that it has a right to life.
Even if we accept that the embryo is a potential person, or that its potential to become a 
self-conscious entity does mean it has a right to life, is the duty not to harm the embryo 
absolute? For example, there is no rule that a potential X has the same or all the rights of an 
X; Prince Charles is a potential King, but he does not now have the rights of a King.150 Thus, 
the wrongness of killing a potential person is open to challenge. There is perhaps more value 
in a potentiality argument that, in recognising the logical difficulty of arguing potentiality as 
a means for a right to life, asserts that the embryo’s potential to develop into a human being is 
indicative not of a right to life but of a need to accord it significant respect.151
Additionally, some philosophers argue that even if we grant that an embryo is a person, the 
moral duty not to harm or kill innocent persons is not absolute and therefore does not naturally 
and without question support an obligation not to destroy human embryos. Savulescu argues 
that even if the embryo is a person killing it may be justified in certain circumstances.152 He 
reasons that it is acceptable to kill one person for the purposes of saving others (he terms this 
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‘cannibalization’) and he points to a number of examples: the accepted practice of ‘reducing’ 
higher order multiple pregnancies to triplets or twins to improve the survival chances of the 
foetuses that are not ‘killed’ through reduction; the practice of foetal craniotomy – the crushing 
of a foetus’s head during birth when necessary to save the mother’s life; and the practice of 
separating conjoined twins, particularly with the purpose of killing one of them to save the 
other. Only those who oppose all killing of any kind can rationally oppose the destruction of an 
embryo solely by virtue of its status as a human person.153 
3.3  arguMents BaseD on tHe syMBolic status oF tHe eMBryo
The difficulties apparent in approaching such novel issues from rights-based or deontological 
perspectives have led some to seek guidance on what we can and cannot do to an embryo 
based on its symbolic status. We should treat the embryo as a person because of our personal 
commitment to the sanctity of human life – although the embryo is neither a ‘person’ nor an 
entity possessing interests, it may be the object of duties based upon a need to demonstrate a 
symbolic commitment to, and respect for, human life. The way in which we treat a developing 
human life reflects and defines the value we place on human life generally.154 In this respect, 
even if embryos do not have rights, they provide an occasion for expressing or symbolising 
one’s views about the importance or value of human life, ‘thereby constituting one’s moral or 
national character in the process.’155 
This moves the debate away from being a dispute about whether embryos have a right to life, 
to the debate about how we demonstrate respect for the sanctity of human life.
A conservative may use this basis to argue that PGD – the creation of human life with the 
intention of genetic testing to ensure that the ‘best’ embryos are implanted and to destroy 
those embryos that are not – weakens or insults our communal respect for the sanctity of 
human life and therefore should be prohibited. In contrast, McGee and Caplan argue that even 
if embryos are ‘persons’, symbolically or intrinsically, that in no way entitles the embryo to a 
‘risk-free pathway into maturation’.156 In other words, symbolic respect for the embryo does 
not necessarily prevent its destruction for worthwhile means. Humans (including embryos), 
they argue, only have a negative right against unwarranted violence, not a positive right to 
life, for example, we do not have a right to be free of disease, disaster, adverse weather or 
other acts of nature that may kill us. The negative right of unwarranted violence against an 
embryo, whatever its moral status, requires that it be destroyed only under the most scrupulous 
conditions ‘for the best communal reasons’.157
What is evident is that people differ over the degree and intensity of the symbolic associations 
that attach to the embryo, and over what types of considerations outweigh that special 
status. This causes difficulty for the symbolic argument. Given the highly personal nature of 
symbolic claims, the argument can provide no definitive basis for acceptable limits of PGD in 
New Zealand.
It appears that there is wide disagreement on how to define a ‘person’ and, consequently, 
disagreement on what we can or can not do to an embryo. That is a reason why some seek 
guidance not from an assessment of what the embryo is or how a particular moral duty 
defines our actions towards the embryo, but rather by an approach that requires us to weigh 
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up the consequences of treating embryos in particular ways or destroying them. Such an 
approach, which is discussed next, is traditionally known in philosophy as utilitarianism or 
consequentialism.
3.4  looking to consequences – a utilitarian aPProacH
Many philosophers argue that it is not in answering the question ‘when does human life 
begin’ that we find guidance on how we ought to treat that human life but rather in assessing 
the consequences of our actions. The theory of looking to consequences to justify action is 
known as consequentialism, a derivative of utilitarianism.158 In utilitarian theory there is only 
one basic principle of ethics: the principle of utility. The principle of utility provides that we 
ought always to act so as to produce the best possible outcome. The ‘best possible outcome’ 
is determined through an assessment of the consequences of the action, where the rightness 
of an action depends on the value of its consequences – the right action in any given case will 
be that action which produces the maximal possible balance of good consequences (or value) 
over bad consequences (or disvalue). ‘Consequences’, broadly defined, include all the good 
and bad produced by the act, whether arising before the act has been performed or during 
or after its performance, and not only the consequences incumbent on the person acting, but 
on everyone affected by the act. Consequences affecting all parties must receive equal and 
impartial consideration.159
One consequentialist approach to the moral status of the embryo begins with the assertion 
that only beings with interests can be harmed by the defeat of those interests. Having interests 
presupposes sentience and because embryos are not sentient, it is morally permissible to 
terminate an embryo – that is, the embryo’s termination affects no one who has interests or, in 
other words, no one can be harmed because there is no identifiable individual with particular 
interests who exists at that time.160
Some consequentialists avoid debates about the moral status of the embryo, and instead argue 
we can determine what we should or should not do to an embryo through an assessment of 
the consequences of using the embryo for any proposed purpose. The course of action that 
should be followed is not determined by whether there is or is not an actually existing entity, 
but by determining the best outcome, regardless of whether this outcome is to be achieved by 
actual or merely possible entities.161 
Applying this type of approach to the question of the permissibility and limits of PGD 
requires an analysis of the likely consequences of creating and destroying embryos with genetic 
mutations in the course of PGD. If the value of proceeding with PGD is greater than the value 
of not proceeding with PGD, then we should rightly use embryos for this purpose. Buckle 
poses the following scenario:
If allowing a present embryo to develop will produce a future state that is less valuable 
than preventing the development of this embryo, and developing instead another, not yet 
conceived, embryo (for example, if the present one is suffering from a congenital defect, or 
if the parents or other appropriately placed parties are unable to care adequately for it), 
then a straightforward application of consequentialist principles requires that we follow 
the latter course.162
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So the question is: will PGD produce a more valuable future state? This is a question at the 
core of the ethical controversy around PGD technology. If PGD is banned, parents, families 
and society will miss out on potential significant benefits and society must bear responsibility 
for those patients and future persons that society has chosen not to assist through permitting 
the use of this technology.163 On the other hand, PGD without restraints may harm society. 
The types of harms that are feared include possible harms to the child (including both 
psychological and physical harms due to concerns about the safety of the technique), negative 
impacts on the parent/child relationship, discrimination against people living with disability, 
widening the gap between social classes,164 and the concern that PGD takes us a step further 
down the slippery slope to ‘designer babies’ and eugenics. More broadly speaking, PGD risks 
compromising human dignity itself where each new application of PGD represents a further 
assault on fundamental values.165 Much can be debated about the perceived harms of PGD and 
feared consequences that may eventuate.
Some observers fear that PGD will have a negative impact on the relationship between parents 
and children,166 for instance, increased parental control over the characteristics of their children 
may subtly shift parental attitudes toward their child from unconditional acceptance to critical 
scrutiny,167 and from selecting embryos without genetic disease to selecting ‘better’ children. 
Increased parental control over the characteristics of their children may undermine the child’s 
self-esteem. In addition, children who are not ‘perfect’ may be viewed as ‘avoidable mistakes’, 
and their parents as responsible for that; children themselves may blame their parents for their 
‘imperfections’. These pressures, it is argued, will result in harm to the future child – the child 
may suffer emotionally and psychologically from learning they were ‘chosen’ on the basis of 
observable genetic preferences and their right to an open, not biologically pre-determined 
future, will be limited, particularly by overbearing parental expectations.
The moral status of the embryo
What moral status should we attribute to the embryo? The conservative view advocates 
that the unborn entity becomes a person at conception – from the moment sperm 
penetrates the egg at fertilisation the embryo is a human individual. On this strict moral 
view the embryo has full moral status as a ‘person’, and it is wrong to attempt to change, 
direct, control, design, or destroy the embryo from the moment of conception onwards. 
In contrast to this strict position the liberal view states that the embryo has no moral 
status; it has no claim to a right to life and can be discarded or used for any purpose. If 
this view is accepted, PGD would be permissible not only to select against offspring with 
serious genetic disease, but also to select for non-health related characteristics. The view 
which intersects these two positions is one which dictates that the embryo gains moral 
status between fertilisation and birth. On this view, the development of personhood is a 
gradual process and, as the unborn entity develops, it is accorded greater moral status and 
right to life. On this view the embryo is deserving of respect, but has a weak moral status 
as compared with a foetus, especially closer to the time of birth.
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3.5  religious PersPectives anD etHical tHinking
Religious perspectives reveal a range of positions on the status of the embryo and on the 
permissibility or restrictions of using the embryo for therapeutic purposes. There appears 
to be a wide diversity of opinions, not just among religious traditions but also within each 
tradition itself. Even where a set of basic convictions may be shared by a particular tradition, 
individual members of that tradition may differ in their judgment about interpretation or 
practice.
It would be ideal if an international body could, if it were possible, undertake systematic 
consultation of each and every religion to help inform the extent, content and principles of 
ethical decision-making in this area. In the meantime, the declared positions by some religious 
traditions and the works of scholars in religious ethics may help in informing ethical thinking 
about the issues. The following discussion is illustrative, rather than representative, of some 
religious perspectives and positions and they are limited to a survey of three theistic religions: 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism.168
Islam comprise two principal schools, Sunni and Shi’a – each of which has theological and 
other differences but both refer to the same historical sources and take a developmental view of 
human life and personhood.  The embryo is regarded as human life meriting some protection 
and is believed to be ensouled from the fortieth day after fertilisation, at which point it is 
thought to attain personhood.  The use of embryos for therapeutic and research purposes may 
be acceptable before this time.
Christianity has numerous distinct traditions, denominations and church bodies.  The 
Protestant tradition regards full human status as being acquired gradually.  However, Protestant 
positions range from the highly restrictive to the non-restrictive.  It is difficult to find a single 
source of authority and, particularly as individual conscience is the core of Protestant ethos, 
Protestant thinking may accept there are differing views that can be held which could be 
compatible with Christian beliefs.
The official position within Roman Catholicism takes the view that human life begins at the 
moment of conception and considers an embryo as a human individual with the right to 
its own life. The implications of this position is that it is not acceptable to use embryos for 
therapeutic purposes and impermissible to destroy or discard embryos.
Jewish thinking based on the Hebrew Bible and Talmudic law holds that the moral status of the 
embryo is dependent upon its developmental stage; the embryo is not considered to have the 
full status of a human being at time of fertilisation. Central to Jewish thought is the emphasis 
on healing and saving which would permit some uses of embryos for therapeutic and research 
purposes.
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4  etHical griDlock anD Policy DeveloPMent
The preceding sections communicate one very important thing – that there are many 
conflicting views on the moral status of the embryo and no overriding reason for necessarily 
accepting one view over another. The outcome of the debate does not provide a universally 
acceptable definition of the status of the embryo or answer to the question as to whether the 
creation and destruction of embryos in the course of PGD is intrinsically wrong. It would 
seem that we have reached a point of ethical gridlock.
Arguments based on a definition of ‘personhood’ fail to convince because no one can quite 
agree on what it is to be a ‘person’ let alone whether the embryo meets any set of proposed 
criterion for personhood. Arguments based on moral duty fail to convince because moral 
duties are demonstrably not absolute and not easily applicable to the embryo. Consequentialist 
approaches are also inadequate because of their implication for using unjust means to achieve 
just ends. So where does this leave us? How do we overcome this ethical gridlock and reach 
moral consensus to help us decide if, and to what extent, we should allow PGD to proceed in 
New Zealand? Does our policy/law on PGD need to reflect an agreed moral principle on the 
status of the embryo?169 
If there is no clear reason for accepting one view over another then we cannot proceed to draw 
conclusions about the intrinsic moral acceptability of PGD or make policy decisions on PGD 
on the basis of one particular view of the embryo. Ideally we may want to resolve this moral 
issue before we make policy on new technologies that involve the creation and discarding of the 
human embryo so that we can be sure we are doing what we ought to be doing. However, given 
the polarised views and lack of basis for accepting one view over another, we need to concede 
that this is an issue on which people may legitimately hold differing views and consensus may 
never be reached. Yet, for many reasons this is an area of biotechnology on which we do require 
clear policy. 
Hare states that we should ‘stop wasting our breath on the question of when human life begins’ 
because it is going to make no difference to the moral question of what the law ought to be.170 
Distinction is drawn between moral principles that should govern public policy, including 
legislation, and moral principles which may be held ‘often passionately’ by individuals, including 
individual legislators. When considering public policy on matters of moral uncertainty, policy 
makers need to make reasoned decision. On this approach, a rational decision about new 
technologies that involve the creation and discarding of a human embryo can legitimately 
be made free from ‘rhetoric’ and ‘propaganda’ that attempt to pressure policy makers into 
accepting one point of view over another.
Robertson states that one group should not impose its own view of the matter onto public 
policy because people differ so deeply in their views of the embryo.171 Policy makers need a way 
in which they can think about such matters in a reasoned manner and decide what ought to 
be done – an approach that does not first require moral consensus. But how can policy makers 
think rationally about matters where there is considerable moral uncertainty?
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Hare argues that they can by falling back on a consequentialist approach that looks seriously 
at the consequences of enacting any proposed legislation and policy. If policy makers want to 
make their actions conform to morality (that is, to pass the laws they morally ought to pass and 
not those laws that they ought not to pass), they should look at what they would be doing if 
they passed or threw them out.172 But as we saw earlier, consequentialist approaches are heavily 
criticised, particularly because the value of the embryo to be taken into account and weighed 
in the moral calculus is unclear. Indeed, when considering these issues in the United Kingdom, 
the Warnock Committee rejected an approach based on utilitarian ethics because: ‘Moral 
questions, such as those with which we have been concerned, are, by definition, questions that 
involve not only a calculation of consequences, but also strong sentiments with regard to the 
nature of the proposed activities themselves.’173 
The next section sets out some constructive approaches to moving forward in the embryo 
status debate and discusses where those approaches take us with regard to policy on the 
acceptable limits of PGD. 
4.1  Moving ForwarD anD FinDing coMMon grounD
For policy purposes, there is much that can be said for an approach that tries to find common 
ground to help shape consensus so as to move the discussion forward, particularly in a pluralistic 
and democratic society like New Zealand. Such an approach to PGD, which will help us to steer 
through polarised standpoints, can ‘win practical answers for pressing problems with a rather 
high rate of acceptance’174 – practical answers as to whether, and to what extent, PGD should 
be limited in New Zealand in a way that respects and acknowledges both sides of the debate. 
This approach has been utilised in other countries to assist in moving forward in the debate to 
make decisions about public policy involving reproductive technologies. For example, the UK 
House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology recently noted:
We accept that [in] a society that is both multi-faith and largely secular, there is never 
going to be consensus on the level of protection accorded to the embryo or the role of the 
state in reproductive decision-making. There are no demonstrably ‘right’ answers to the 
complex ethical, moral and political equations involved. We respect the views of all sides 
on these issues. We recognise the difficulty of achieving consensus between protagonists 
in opposing camps in this debate, for example the pro-life groups and those advocating 
an entirely libertarian approach to either assisted reproduction or research use of the 
embryo. We believe, however, that to be effective this Committee’s conclusions should seek 
consensus, as far as it is possible to achieve.175
So are there any points of common ground or matters on which consensus can be achieved in 
the debate about what we should or should not allow to be done to embryos? Thévoz suggests 
that there are six premises regarding the embryo that attract a reasonable consensus:
~ everybody now existing has developed from an embryo – accordingly, we can agree there 
is an aspect of continuity between embryos and human beings;
~ not every embryo, however, develops into a full human being – there is a high failure 
rate;
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~ human embryos stem from human beings – there is a shared origin;
~ human embryos grow and gain new faculties and potentialities through time;
~ human embryos deserve some protection – the burden of proof belongs to those who 
want to diminish or withdraw protection; 
~ every embryo is the result of human intervention, but not all those interventions are 
equal.176
Effectively, the points of common ground noted by Thévoz are that the majority can recognise 
that embryos have a ‘human element’ – they have a shared origin with living human beings, 
and there is a sense of continuity between the embryo and living human beings. What does 
this mean for the discussion about what we may or may not do to embryos? It does not mean 
we ought to treat embryos as we would treat living human beings because of their conditional 
development. What we can say is that the ‘human element’ accorded to human embryos leaves 
us with the supposition that human embryos are something special and, although a range 
of divided opinions are expressed, it is implicit in the majority of arguments that embryos 
deserve respect.
Clearly conservatives would agree with the basic proposition that embryos are special and 
deserve to be respected. However, would more liberal theorists also agree that this is a point 
of common ground? A small group with extreme liberal views may argue not but those 
holding the view that embryos lack interests or rights because embryos are not persons, do 
not necessarily view embryos as identical to any other human tissue – even they may not 
be comfortable with anything at all being done with embryos, for example, using them for 
toxicology testing of cosmetics, buying and selling them, or eating them. Indeed, as noted by 
Robertson, many such persons would agree that although embryos lack rights or interests, 
they deserve special respect.177
Most would agree that the human embryo is special and deserves a level of respect, whether such 
respect confers the embryo full, moderate, or weak moral status. It is this common ground that 
can be used as a basis to move the discussion forward from the ‘seemingly endless argument 
about the embryo’s status’178 to how we might go about deciding, for policy purposes, what 
we may or may not legitimately do with the embryo. However, in doing so, it is important to 
again acknowledge that this approach will not be supported by all protagonists in the debate, 
although lack of consensus does not render the approach invalid. As noted by Gorovitz:
[T]o say that the quest for consensus, like the quest for certainty, is hopeless, is not to 
say that just any policy will do. Even amidst the pluralistic currents of ethical argument, 
there are constraints on what we can defend morally. At the heart of these constraints 
are widely shared commitments to fairness, to a respect for persons, and to a derivative 
respect for the aspirations that people have. We should be guided as well as we can by those 
moral principles that capture, insofar as possible, the common moral ingredients that exist 
within our pluralistic culture. We will find that quite hard enough without insisting on 
consensus.179 
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tHe Moral status oF tHe eMBryo: exaMining new ZealanD Policy 
anD guiDelines
While there is a contrasting range of views about the moral status of the embryo, Parliament 
has indicated that, in terms of policy, creating and discarding an embryo is justifiable in some 
circumstances. Prenatal screening and selective abortion have taken place in New Zealand for a 
number of years.180 Additionally, in May 2005, the Minister of Health approved the Guidelines 
on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis developed by the National Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Human Reproduction (the NECAHR Guidelines), making PGD an established procedure 
under the HART Act. This means that PGD can proceed in New Zealand in accordance with the 
NECAHR Guidelines which permit testing and selection on the basis of single gene disorders, 
familial sex-linked disorders, non-familial chromosomal disorders associated with advanced 
reproductive age, non-familial chromosomal disorders associated with infertility181 and HLA 
tissue typing when approved on a case-by-case basis by NECAHR. The Guidelines prohibit 
the use of PGD for specified reasons that include non-medical sex selection, alteration of the 
genetic constitution of an embryo, and selection of embryos with a genetic impairment seen 
in a parent. PGD beyond the scope of the approved NECAHR Guidelines or the HART Act is 
prohibited.182
While screening of embryos for genetic disorders and HLA tissue typing is already legal in 
certain circumstances, further discussion about the ethical issues raised by PGD is necessary. 
As science broadens the scope for identification and diagnosis of genetic disorders and traits, 
New Zealand will need to consider the parameters within which PGD will be allowed to 
develop. Should PGD technology also be used on diseases that people have a lower chance 
of getting and diseases that may occur later in life? Should the Guidelines be amended to 
allow for screening for genetic ‘traits’ and ‘social’ reasons? How will New Zealand deal with the 
technology of PGD as it develops? Should PGD be reconsidered and prohibited, should its use 
and availability be limited,; or should it be made available to everyone with no limits on its use? 
A balance will need to be struck between the uses of new PGD technologies and restraint.183 As 
such, policy makers cannot ignore ethical and moral arguments pertaining to the use of PGD 
technology or the need for temperate and rational moral debate184 in considering the limits 
of PGD. Ethical analysis serves an important role in informing policy makers. It is through 
examination and reflection of the diversity of views on highly contentious issues that we can 
begin to consider the limits of regulation in a manner that is informed and representative of 
the broadest consensus.
The moral status of the embryo has already been debated in the context of abortion and, more 
recently, embryo research. The question therefore arises: why is the debate being revisited in 
the context of PGD? Can we not just accept that it is an issue plagued by controversy and 
conflicting views and seek to move forward from there? Hare has argued that ‘to put the matter 
bluntly: we should stop wasting our breath on the question of when does human life begin’ 
because the question will make no difference to the moral question of what the law in this 
area ought to be.185 However, Hare also notes that, to be helpful, committees set up to advise 
Governments on such issues need to examine and assess the arguments on both sides and 
clarify the issues between them. Repeating intuitions that are current without going carefully 
into the arguments that might support them does not enlighten public discussion and ‘will not 
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do as a means of arriving at rational guidance for governments on moral questions affecting 
policy’.186 In other words, when considering and advising on such issues, it is important to look 
for and test the arguments on both sides - while consensus may be difficult or impossible, all 
voices need to be heard in the deliberations. There is still a strong body of opinion in New 
Zealand opposed to PGD on the basis of the moral status of the embryo187 and it is important 
that these views are considered and given weight in the assessment of how far we should permit 
this technology to develop.
5  conclusion
There are many differing views on the moral status of embryos, and what we may or may not 
legitimately do with or to them. No one particular view of the status of the embryo stands out as 
an overriding ‘correct’ view. It can be concluded that we have reached a point of ethical gridlock 
on the moral status of the embryo, and that this is an issue on which people may legitimately hold 
differing views. Despite that, it is clear some principles are needed to govern the development and 
use of new technologies that involve the creation and destruction of embryos. 
In moving forward, we need to consider our policy options in the face of lack of consensus on 
the moral status of the embryo by changing the focus of discussion from debating the moral 
status of the embryo to finding the appropriate way to treat the embryo for policy purposes in 
a pluralistic society. For the purpose of developing constructive policy, we have to investigate 
whether a common policy can be developed which takes all perspectives into consideration. 
Common policy can be founded on the most significant point shared by the majority of views 
on the moral status of the embryo – that the embryo is something special and deserves a level 
of respect. We can demonstrate respect for embryos in what we allow embryos to be used for, 
and the manner in which they are treated. The most appropriate and widely used way to do so 
is to take a consequentialist-based approach. Concerns about consequentialist approaches can 
be addressed by framing the consequentialist assessment with agreed bottom-line principles 
about what respecting the embryo means (for example, that embryos should not be destroyed 
for trivial reasons and should be used only for reasons that maintain respect for the sanctity 
of human life).  On such an approach, utilising PGD in the limited therapeutic circumstances 
currently provided for in the NECAHR Guidelines would seem consistent with respecting the 
embryo. The consequentialist approach, whilst not unproblematic as an approach to resolving 
moral dilemmas, is an attractive, pragmatic, and reasonable solution to moving forward to 
make policy about new technologies that involve the human embryo. Although useful for 
policy making, this approach will not completely satisfy all protagonists in the ethical debate 
about the moral status of the embryo. It is important to acknowledge that this approach is 
a pragmatic solution for policy purposes only – it is not an approach that attempts to make 
conclusions about the intrinsic moral status of the embryo.
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Part D:  PuBlic oPinion anD PercePtions oF reProDuctive 
genetic tecHnologies
1  introDuction: wHat is so iMPortant aBout PuBlic   
 oPinion?
The term ‘public’ is usually used to refer to a group of people, often referred to as the people. 
It is intended to be completely inclusive, such that every person is accounted for by reference 
to the public. The scope of the term can be deliberately restricted, such that it is used to refer 
to a certain subset or subsets of all possible people, through appropriate qualification, as in 
‘the New Zealand public’ or ‘the lay public’ for example. This highlights two related facets 
of the concept of the public. First, that it is composed of individuals who, depending on the 
purpose, may be usefully grouped according to relevant common features. Second, that this 
may indicate a potential, or perhaps even inevitable, tension among individuals and groups 
that comprise the public. This presents problems for identifying what is the public opinion 
about something.
The most basic unit of which the public is composed is the individual. This fact has many 
implications for the concept of the public. Individuals differ greatly in a vast number of 
aspects. These include age, sex, social situation, physical location, intellect, education, religion, 
ethnicity, culture, financial situation, areas of knowledge, understanding and expertise, and so 
forth. Each of these categories is perhaps best regarded as a conceptual tool, which is unlikely 
to ‘carve the individual at the joints’. This is particularly important in the empirical analysis of 
public opinion, where the effect of various factors (often equated with these categories) may 
be inferred from statistical analysis. These inferences can lead to simplistic interpretations 
being given to the roles of these categories in influencing and determining public opinion, 
and their relevance as categories of differentiation between subsets of the public. There is 
also an important temporal aspect to these categorisations. Accounting for an individual’s 
current qualities in terms of these categories may poorly reflect the actual attributes of the 
individual which influence their opinions. These qualities or attributes are gained at different 
times during an individual’s life, and their effects can persist regardless of their immediate 
presence at any subsequent time. Gaining these qualities or attributes over time may be seen 
as part of the story which informs an individual’s life and actions. This is often termed the 
narrative of the individual, and forms the basis of the emerging subject of narrative ethics. It 
is unlikely that this narrative will be adequately represented by categorisation of individuals 
based on specific attributes at any single time, if such representation is required.
How significant are these issues for determining public opinion? The answer depends upon 
the purpose of surveying and analysing public opinion. It may be perfectly adequate to 
have no idea of the narrative of the individual – in fact, many individuals may not wish to 
reveal information about themselves to the degree that would permit analysis of narratives, 
rendering such a project difficult or impossible. The purpose of any investigation into public 
opinion will likely be the single greatest factor determining the character both of any empirical 
research conducted to examine public opinion and the information elicited by such research. 
For example, the purpose could be to determine overall acceptability of a particular use of a 
specific technology, such that a simple expression of approval or disapproval is sufficient. Or 
200
the purpose could be to investigate what factors inform an individual’s opinion about such a 
practice, how they influence it, the nature of these factors, how they interact, how justifiable 
they may be, and so on. The latter will require a quite different empirical approach in order to 
achieve its aims, if they can be achieved at all.
Discussing the purpose of research into public opinions and perceptions also raises a more 
fundamental question: Why look into public opinion at all? As already mentioned, any public 
group will comprise a variable number of individuals all of whom are likely to differ to greater 
or lesser degrees in their opinions and perceptions of any single issue or object of interest. 
Even if they do agree about a simple opinion, such as the acceptability or otherwise of a 
practice, they may differ in their reasons for holding this opinion, and this basic continuity 
of opinion may not necessarily be extended to include other, similar practices, despite the 
presence of seemingly relevant similarities. Opinions, be they aligned or opposed, can be 
based to varying degrees on information, which will be of varying quality. Information may be 
factually incorrect or illogical, to varying degrees objective or subjective, or could conceivably 
be so different as to be incommensurable with other information. Each individual’s ability to 
assimilate information and reason to a conclusion will also vary. As a result of these and other 
factors, any individual is likely to hold opinions that are variably logical or illogical, rational 
or irrational, and coherent or contradictory. The range of opinions given by an individual or 
groups of individuals therefore may be of dubious status as a coherent framework for decision-
making, judged on these attributes.
However, perhaps this is to give undue authority to qualities such as objectivity, factuality, 
logic, rationality and consistency in determining the legitimacy of opinions and decisions. 
Do our opinions only attain validity and legitimacy to the extent to which they embrace these 
qualities? Authority may also be given to factors such as subjective experience, emotion, and 
partiality. These two broad sources of justification are often dichotomised, such that the use 
of one is thought necessarily to exclude or at least restrict use of the other as an unavoidable 
consequence. Debate about the role of emotion, rationality and subjectivity in ethics is as old 
as ethics itself, but is also enjoying something of a renaissance presently, with the emergence 
of feminist ethics and renewed interest in the virtue ethics articulated by Aristotle. These and 
other systems of ethics seek, among other things, to redress what they see as an unjustified 
emphasis on logic and rationality in ethics, which, they contend, limits its usefulness.
Ignoring for the moment the consequences of such a debate, we are left with the issue of the 
usefulness and relevance of public opinion for ethics, and the roles that both public opinion 
and ethics might play in society and how they might interact. Perhaps the most passive role that 
ethics could play in society is to act as an assimilator and communicator of public opinion. In 
this model, ethics would simply reflect the values expressed by the public. At the other extreme, 
the most active role that ethics might play is to formulate moral values and frameworks of 
thought derived independently from public opinion, which may or may not reflect or in any 
way resemble public opinion. A third model falls somewhere between these two extremes. The 
role of ethics may be to review public opinion and values, and subject them to critical analysis 
in an attempt to reduce the presence of unethical values and practices188. None of these three 
models is unproblematic, and, for good or ill, in practice a variable mixture of some or all of 
these is likely to occur in many situations.
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The two models that make use of public opinion seem to require a depth of knowledge about 
public opinion that extends beyond mere expressions of approval or disapproval for certain 
practices and conduct. This is less the case for the passive, reflective model, but it is unlikely 
to be very efficient if it does not attempt to ascertain some general rules held by the public 
to be useful guides for decision-making. It therefore appears that, if public opinion is to be 
incorporated into ethical deliberation, something more than a superficial knowledge of it is 
required. These requirements must translate into the methodology of any empirical research 
into public opinion, if this research is designed to inform ethical deliberation on any topic.
Many investigations into public opinions relating to science and technology have been 
conducted. Often, this is to discern perceptions and opinions relating to a specific area of 
science or technology, particular scientific practices, or individual technologies. The increasing 
use of molecular genetic science and technology is one area that has been a locus of research 
interest in this regard. Characterising the public morality regarding these technologies can 
usefully inform the ethical scrutiny they are subject to. Estrangement of this scrutiny from 
public opinion and public morality can reduce the relevance and acceptance of any public 
policy that it informs. In the case of genetic science and technology, their applications within the 
sphere of human reproduction raise many ethical issues which are often central determinants 
of public perceptions and opinion. The purpose of much research has therefore been to 
explore and characterise public perceptions and opinions relating to human reproduction 
per se, and practices involving the intersection of this with genetic science and technology. 
Current research from outside New Zealand suggests that public perceptions and opinions of 
particular relevance to this area concern the following:
~ Conception, the embryo, foetus and pregnancy
~ Children, families and relationships
~ Freedom of control over aspects of ourselves and others
~ Naturalness of biological processes, technological and scientific involvement in 
reproduction
~ Attitudes to human genetic attributes and genetic inheritance
~ What constitutes desirable or undesirable features of a future society
~ What constitutes harm and suffering and the value of these
Perhaps the largest bodies of research into these issues have investigated public opinions and 
perceptions in the USA and UK. Other research have also been conducted in Australia and 
Asian countries. Research in New Zealand has focussed largely on a different area of genetic 
science and technology: that of genetic modification. The New Zealand research into this, 
particularly as exemplified by the Royal Commission of Inquiry in Genetic Modification 
released in 2001,189 has generally been viewed as a highly proactive and thorough scrutiny of 
an emerging area of science and technology prior to large scale use of its practices in a country. 
This provides a large body of research into opinions and perceptions of the New Zealand 
public about this range of genetic practices. However, the relevance of this information to 
genetic practices related to human reproduction is a matter of some uncertainty. The use of 
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genetic techniques in human reproduction is briefly addressed, but it is not a focus of the 
Royal Commission or its report. It is possible for some degree of inference to be made from 
opinions about other genetic technologies to reproductive matters, however the reliability of 
this is likely to vary greatly among individuals and objects of consideration. This is particularly 
likely when considering human reproduction, an issue that is often held in special regard. 
These inferences therefore do not provide a sound basis for ethical reasoning about an issue, or 
conclusions to be drawn about matters relating to the development of public policy, although 
they may be used judiciously to inform such undertakings.
Another approach is to use information derived from other public groups, such as those from 
other countries, and apply this to the New Zealand situation. The assumption that the same or 
similar opinions will arise in different countries may, to some degree, be borne out by an analysis 
of the data. It is also suggested by the concept of a ‘common morality’ within ethics. This is the 
theory that, ultimately, there are some common factors which, implicitly or explicitly inform 
ethical deliberation, regardless of any other differences thought to be involved (such as between 
explicit moral frameworks, cultures etc.). This theory is by no means universally accepted, 
but does offer a theoretical account of some commonalities in moral conduct and reasoning 
among different groups. However, there are other factors that militate in favour of conducting 
research specifically into the New Zealand public’s opinions about reproductive genetic 
technologies. These include the recognition of the New Zealand public as an independent 
group, which presents the possibility of unique moral considerations and opinions, or at least 
a unique mixture of opinions existing elsewhere. Of particular consideration in this regard 
is the presence of different ethnic groups in New Zealand, including, but not limited to 
Mäori and Päkehä, who may draw on unique moral concepts or apply these in ways different 
from other public groups. Indeed, the assumption that the common morality concept can 
account for a Mäori moral framework, which has itself not been well-characterised in the 
context of academic ethics, is dubious. Even accepting the common morality concept does not 
negate the value of research into particular expressions of this morality in different contexts. 
Moral conduct appears to be heterogeneous in many situations in the world, and is likely to 
be influenced in sophisticated ways by circumstances and other factors particular to these 
situations. This phenomenon is of ethical interest even if viewed as an expression of a single 
common morality. Also, the fact that New Zealand is alone in the world in having conducted 
a Royal Commission of Inquiry into genetic modification suggests that the New Zealand 
public may be particularly concerned, or at least have a particular interest, in influencing the 
development and use of genetic technologies in New Zealand. However, as noted previously, 
it is difficult to have a high degree of confidence in these generalised inferences in the absence 
of direct evidence.
It is therefore recommended that research be conducted into perceptions and opinions of the 
New Zealand public relating to the use of genetic practices in human reproduction. Aside from 
the value of this research in informing ethical considerations, there are pragmatic and political 
reasons in favour of conducting this research. Given that the benefits as well as the costs of the 
use of new technologies are ultimately borne by the public, there are significant arguments 
in favour of them exerting some control over the use of such technologies. Politically, free 
expression of public opinion is fundamental to democratic government, and the use of this 
opinion to inform the development of public policy is essential to the legitimacy of such policy. 
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Pragmatically, any public policy estranged from public opinion and morality is unlikely to be 
widely accepted.
In the New Zealand situation, very little empirical research has been conducted into opinions 
and perceptions of the public relating to PGD. New Zealand is a world-leader in research into 
the use of genetic modification, and public perceptions of these, which were presented in the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. This showed the diverse interests 
that the public possessed and how they perceived them to be, or potentially to be, affected by 
genetic modification technologies. Unfortunately, these opinions and interests are not easily 
extended to encompass new and different technologies such as PGD. As already mentioned, 
complex factors can affect an individual’s perception and attitude regarding objects of 
consideration, even when the object itself remains constant. The implications of changing 
the object of consideration, say from genetic modification of a foodstuff or animal, to genetic 
testing of human embryos prior to implantation in the uterus, can be unpredictable. 
In order to be of greatest use, this research must be conducted according to a methodology 
that is appropriate both to the characteristics of the New Zealand public, and the purposes for 
which such information is to be used. This will involve accounting for many methodological 
factors, some of which have been mentioned briefly. In terms of purpose, an attempt must 
be made to characterise the moral frameworks used by members of the public, since this is 
likely to be of broadest ethical use and will most usefully inform the development of public 
policy. Simple surveying of public approval or disapproval of technologies and practices is 
likely to provide a weak basis for justification of any normative conclusions reached. However, 
knowledge of the quantitative presence of opinions and moral values held by the public can 
usefully inform ethical deliberation. It is therefore recommended that a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research be conducted into the opinions and perceptions within 
the New Zealand public regarding the use of genetic technologies in human reproduction. 
These may then be analysed in the context of New Zealand research concerning other genetic 
technologies, international research concerning other public groups, and current ethical 
thought.
What’s so important about public opinion?
The public is an extremely complex and diverse group of individuals. They differ in 
many characteristics, such as age, level of knowledge and education, social situation 
and cultural background. These factors may affect the value of individuals’ opinions for 
ethical deliberation. The question of how to handle differences in views, especially those 
that are diametrically opposed, also arises. Not all individuals may be able to represent 
themselves equally in the public sphere. Despite these problems, critical use of public 
views and perceptions can usefully inform ethical deliberation and the formulation of 
policy.
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2  wHat grouPs oF PuBlic oPinion are oF Particular   
 relevance to stuDies oF PgD?
Any group of the public that is affected by a particular technology is relevant to ethical 
investigations of the technology. Indeed, it would be difficult to conceive of a group that was 
unaffected by a technology being of any great relevance to ethical deliberation about it. This 
is not to say that unaffected individuals or groups may not be involved in the deliberation per 
se. It is merely to say that any ethical deliberation must take account of the ethically relevant 
aspects of a technology, and one of the ethically relevant aspects is the technology’s effect, i.e. 
the consequences of its use. If a technology has no consequences for any morally considerable 
party, the views of that party ought to be apportioned an amount of weight proportional to 
these consequences in ethical deliberation.
This is not to say that all ethical deliberation about technologies ought to be consequentialist; 
rather that consideration of consequences is an important part in ethical reasoning. 
Consequences are often contrasted with intrinsic factors relating to an object of ethical 
inquiry. An intrinsic objection would posit that something is morally wrong regardless 
of the consequences that it may engender: as an example, it might be argued that guns are 
intrinsically wrong, and therefore ought not to be used, even if they were the only means of 
procuring food to feed a starving population which would otherwise die. One of the most 
prominent systems of ethics which is predicated on intrinsic factors is deontology, which was 
developed primarily by Immanuel Kant. Deontology posits formal rules dictating actions that 
are intrinsically good, regardless of their consequences. Both intrinsic and consequentialist 
considerations come into play in the ethics of PGD.
In fact, even groups who are mainly thought to hold intrinsic objections to technologies such 
as PGD may be affected by its use, but in a broader sense. If I had the intrinsic objection to 
guns mentioned in the previous example, I might be affected by the knowledge that guns 
were being used in the manner described, and this might cause me some degree of suffering, 
which means that I am being affected by the situation and ought to be accorded some degree 
of consideration.
In the case of PGD, there are many parties that can potentially be affected. These may include 
(but may not be limited to): the embryo(s); the resulting child, the female undergoing the 
procedure; the person(s) who provided gametes for fertilisation; those involved in a relationship 
with any of these parties, such as partners, husbands, wives, family, friends and so forth; and 
those who live with the genetic diseases which may be tested for. As mentioned previously, 
other parties can be affected in a more indirect manner. For example, as a member of society, I 
may say that I would like to live in a society that is as free from disease and suffering as possible, 
and therefore that I will be positively affected by the use of PGD simply by living in a society 
that as closely as possible resembles my ideal. PGD may not have any more direct effect on me 
than that, but I may hold my experiences to be worthy of some consideration alongside those 
of people more directly affected by it.
But how much consideration ought each party’s experiences to be accorded? This is a subject 
of great debate in ethics, and will not be resolved here. It is especially problematic when 
experiences and interests conflict or encourage incompatible resolutions to a problem. There 
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are many examples of these in PGD. One is the conflict that can occur between, on the one 
side, potential parents who would like to selectively implant an embryo free of a certain genetic 
disease, and, on the other side, the community of those who have genetic disease. The potential 
parents may have certain desires for their child-to-be, their family, themselves, society, and so 
forth, which they think may be promoted by the use of PGD to produce a baby free from this 
genetic disease and be frustrated by being prevented from using it. The community which 
has this disease (and potentially those with other diseases) may have certain desires for the 
same objects of concern, which would be frustrated by the use of PGD and be promoted by 
prevention of its use. These concerns have been discussed in section 1 of this chapter, and the 
example serves to illustrate some of the conflict of desires, experiences and interests that can 
arise between the different groups affected by PGD.
What groups of public opinion are of particular relevance to studies of PGD?
In the case of PGD, there are many parties that can potentially be affected, and in different 
ways. These may include (but may not be limited to): the embryo(s); the resulting 
child, the female undergoing the procedure; the person(s) who provided gametes for 
fertilisation; those involved in a relationship with any of these parties, such as partners, 
husbands, wives, family, friends and so forth; and those who live with the genetic diseases 
which may be tested for. Other parties can also be affected in a more indirect manner. 
The degree to which individuals and groups of individuals are affected by PGD is an 
important determinant of how much consideration they should be accorded in reasoning 
about this issue.
3  tHe use oF PuBlic PercePtions anD oPinions in etHics
As mentioned in the introduction, the use of public perceptions and opinions in ethics is not 
as clear as is often thought. We are all aware of ill-considered actions that we and others have 
performed at times. Sometimes, with hindsight, we become conscious of many aspects of our 
conduct and those of others that we did not consider ethical or unethical. Sometimes we may 
conduct ourselves in ways that we think actually are unethical, but feel compelled to continue 
anyway. Sometimes we are mistaken about ethically relevant aspects of a situation, which can 
lead us to perform unethical actions without being aware of it. If, as a purely hypothetical 
example, we were to discover (contrary to all current scientific knowledge), that the embryos 
used in PGD were capable of experiencing pain, we may judge the destruction of embryos 
rather differently than we do currently, and may seek to improve our practices by, for example, 
ensuring that embryo destruction occurred painlessly. (Note that this may not be all that we do 
to remedy the situation, but is an example of a minimal step that may be taken.)
The hypothetical example of the embryo is one in which we are unaware of the interests and 
preferences of the being in question (say, the interest the hypothetical embryo may have in 
avoiding pain), which leads to lack of awareness of a potential harm, in that case, the harm 
done by causing a being to experience pain needlessly. Unfamiliarity with the range of interests 
of those affected in a situation or by an action can similarly lead to unawareness of the potential 
benefits that may be produced by an action.
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It is here that public perceptions and opinion are of great importance to ethics. In order to be 
effective, ethics must as completely as possible account for the realities experienced by those 
within its sphere. A relatively easy way of obtaining this information is by inquiring into whose 
experience is being affected by an action, and then what the qualities of their experience may 
be. In the case of PGD, there are many parties who are able to express themselves to a greater 
or lesser degree on this issue, such as adults and children. The degree to which these groups are 
capable of articulating their views will vary according to their ability and the forum in which 
the views are solicited and presented (this will also be discussed in the later section addressing 
methodological considerations).
Of particular interest is the variable ability of individuals to express themselves. This is 
particularly the case for certain groups which often represent minorities in society, such as 
children and people with physical and intellectual disabilities. Both groups have suffered, 
and continue to suffer, from diminished presence in public discussions. The situation for the 
disabled community is described well by Gerber:
So powerful is the voice of disabled people becoming, and so powerful are the intellectual 
and ideological forces that seek to give that voice centrality in shaping the discussion of 
disability, that it may soon become difficult to recall that a short time ago people with 
disabilities were little more than the objects of study. Their voice had less legitimacy and 
less authority than that of the medical, rehabilitation, educational and welfare bureacracy 
[sic] professionals who studied and worked with them. Generally, these experts have been 
well-meaning people, who have often urged compassion and responsibility on societies 
guilty of cruelty or indifference. But their conceptions of disability and of disabled people 
gave rise to the development of social policy that imposed, in the name of a benign 
paternalism, bureaucratic manipulation and socio-economic dependence, and ultimately 
dead-end lives, on people with disabilities.
Perhaps since Bogdan & Taylor (1976) published their widely cited article consisting 
largely of the oral testimony of a man diagnosed as retarded, and challenged readers to 
grant him the authority to speak about his understanding of his life, researchers have 
increasingly sought to have retarded people speak for themselves. These researchers are 
urging a conceptual reorientation not only out of a sense of fairness or of the need to 
recognize the human dignity of retarded people, but as an essential step in recasting social 
welfare policy. […] For example, working with the written testimonies produced for a 
literary expression workshop, of people considerably more impaired developmentally than 
Bogdan & Taylor’s “Ed Murphy”, Susan Lea (1988) revealed coherent self-understandings 
and personal aspirations and fears among them. 190
The situation described by Gerber relates well to that of children too, whose experiences are 
now being heard. One study of particular relevance to PGD is that of Sartain et al.,191 who 
interviewed children suffering from chronic illnesses such as cystic fibrosis, concluding that 
“children can communicate competently their experiences of ill health and health-care”192. 
However, they discovered that the experiences of these children are not uniform and concluded 
that they ought not to be considered a homogeneous group.193,194
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Ethics may be done without taking into account these sorts of real-world experiences, but, to 
use the distinction of the ethicist James Rachels, this would be classed as pure ethics, or moral 
philosophy. He contrasts this with applied ethics, which takes into account the real-world 
factors that affect an ethical scenario:
It has been argued by many philosophers that there is nothing immoral in mercy-killing, 
when it is requested by a dying person as a humane alternative to a slow, painful death. 
Others have objected that if mercy-killings were permitted it would lead to further killings 
that we would not want – we might begin by killing people at their own request to put 
them out of misery, it is said, but then we would begin to pressure sick people into making 
such requests, and that would lead to killing old people who have not requested it (for their 
own good, of course), and then we would go on killing the feeble-minded, and so on. […] 
What would follow? It would not follow that mercy-killing is immoral in the original case. 
The objection would show, paradoxically, that there are good reasons why we should not 
perform actions that are moral and humane. Those reasons would have to do with the 
imperfections of human beings – the claim is that people are so flawed that they would 
slide down the slippery slope from the (moral) practice of euthanasia to the additional 
(immoral) practices described.
This suggests that moral philosophy might be idealistic in a way that applied ethics is not. 
[…] Applied ethics […] takes into account the messy details of the real world, including 
the prejudices, faults and vices of real human beings, and recommends how we should 
behave considering all that as well as the ideals of perfect conduct. 195 
Incorporation of the factors mentioned by Rachels into ethical analysis yields applied ethics, 
which is likely to produce the most workable solution to an ethical issue such as the use of 
PGD, embedded as it is in the human social and psychological context. The effectiveness of 
applied ethics in the human context is therefore predicated partly on the degree to which 
ethicists understand the attitudes, perceptions, opinions and motivations of the public 
(another predicate being a sound understanding of ethics!).
This is also why a sound understanding of these human factors is crucial to the successful 
development of public policy. A public policy estranged from the characteristics of the 
public which it involves can have unintended consequences (as illustrated by Rachels). These 
consequences may not necessarily be bad, but ought not to be left to chance if this is avoidable. 
Public policy that does not fit well with aspects of the public psychology also risks being 
ignored by the public and therefore being simply ineffective. 
There are therefore ethical and pragmatic reasons for understanding public psychology 
relating to objects of ethical and policy deliberation: ethical reasons such as avoiding problems 
of unintended and potentially unethical consequences, and pragmatic reasons such as finding 
effective ways to apply moral philosophy in the messy world of human affairs as either applied 
ethics or public policy.
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The use of public perceptions and opinions in ethics
Ethical deliberation could be entirely driven by public views and opinions, or it could 
be conducted with no regard given to these factors. Both of these extremes engender 
problems, and a middle ground between them is likely to be most reasonable and effective. 
This is the domain of practical ethics, the aim of which is to produce the best solution 
to ethical problems considering the practical realities within which we live. This solution 
must account for the diverse interests of the public, which necessitates a thorough 
understanding of public views, perceptions and opinions, which express these interests. 
In this way empirical research into the ways individuals relate to issues such as PGD plays 
an important role in informing ethical reasoning.
4  an exPloration oF PuBlic PercePtions anD oPinions   
 relating to PgD
4.1  soMe MetHoDological consiDerations
Methodological considerations of empirical research into social elements such as public 
opinions, perceptions and attitudes, constitutes an extremely broad topic which has been 
the subject of a great deal of research196,197,198, 199, 200, 210, 202. This will be condensed into those 
methodological aspects of immediate relevance to the provision of empirical data that is of 
greatest use for ethical deliberation and analysis. It is important to note that, due to practical 
impediments, it may be impossible to realise fully some of the aims of empirical research. 
However, this does not negate the use of such aims in shaping the research. 
A primary consideration of empirical research is that the range of opinions held by the public 
be represented in the data as completely and accurately as possible. This representation 
can be proportional, such that opinions are present in the data to a degree representative 
of their proportional presence in the public. Or opinions can be represented qualitatively, 
which does not allow ready inferences to be made about the prevalence of opinions in the 
public repertoire, but aims to characterise accurately the often sophisticated qualities of these 
opinions. There is some practical tension between these two aims, since achieving a statistically 
accurate representation of the range of public opinion usually comes at the expense of the 
depth and accuracy with which that opinion can be characterised, and vice versa. Both types of 
information are of ethical value, and the absence of either will restrict the types of conclusions 
that may be reached through ethical analysis. However, it is likely that the absence of significant 
qualitative data would be of greater detriment to most ethical analysis, although this is, of 
course, a generalisation.
Opinions and perceptions are not generally static entities – they are usually subject to constant 
assessment and revision over time, in light of various factors. This temporal quality can be 
addressed methodologically through the incorporation of a longitudinal element into the 
research design. In its simplest form this may involve repeating the investigation with some or 
all of the participants, to discern any changes in opinion. This approach provides interesting 
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information, but it is likely to be of limited use if the reasons for change, or indeed absence of 
change, in public opinion are not investigated. This will necessitate a more qualitative aspect, 
and again highlights the significance of the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy for this type of 
research.
Another approach to investigating factors thought to be capable of changing public opinion 
is to incorporate these in a controlled way into the research method. An example of this is 
the influence that knowledge about a practice or issue plays in determining an individual’s 
perceptions and opinions of it. The effect of this factor may be investigated by characterising 
the opinions of individuals before and after an intervention which is designed to increase 
their knowledge of the object of opinion (the issue, practice, etc.), such as the provision of 
information in some meaningful form. This technique has advantages and disadvantages over 
other ways of attempting to discern the same information. One of these, which is emblematic 
of a general problem in research, is the resemblance of such an intervention to what goes on in 
reality, and therefore what can legitimately be inferred from the results of such research.
This approach also changes the explicit nature of the inquiry from passive observation of 
certain aspects of the experimental subjects, to attempting to influence actively these aspects 
in the course of the research. This complex issue can be approached in different ways, one 
of which is to undermine the belief in passive observation as a realistic and achievable aim 
for experimental research generally. These and other objections notwithstanding, observation 
may, to varying degrees, be active or passive, and the attempt to control this is reasonable 
and valuable in a research context. For example, the act of recruiting an individual who then 
answers some questions is, in essence, one of active observation. The possibility that the data 
provided by this individual have, to some extent – however small – been influenced by the act 
of observation should not be dismissed lightly, if at all. 
However, steps can be taken to minimise this by identifying sources of influence and taking 
them into account in the experimental design. Two simple examples of this are the wording of 
questions and the format within which individuals will present data. The wording and framing 
of questions can profoundly affect the types of responses elicited. Framing questions within 
the context of a scenario illustrating the issue or object of questioning can help participants 
who have difficulty responding to more abstract or general questions. However, scenarios 
are inevitably rather specific and care must be taken to use examples of as broad relevance 
and appeal to participants as possible, to minimise bias in participant response. Alternatively, 
attempts can be made to use scenarios that are tailored to specific participant groups, if groups 
are based on relevant characteristics. When questions are used, care must be taken to present 
the objects of interest in as neutral a light as possible. This can often be much harder than 
anticipated in practice, and neutrality can easily be construed as another unachievable goal. 
With regard to the format of interviewing participants, this can take many forms, each of 
which has advantages and disadvantages, and will alter the character of response received. 
Some examples include one-on-one interviews, questionnaire-based surveys, focus groups, 
phone-based interviews and surveys, and questionnaires. Each of these will entail further 
considerations, such as whether to group participants randomly or based on common 
characteristics in the case of focus groups, which can affect the willingness of individuals to 
participate and share information, and so forth.
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An exploration of public perceptions and opinions relating to PGD
Some methodological considerations
The diversity and size of the public poses problems for empirical determinations of 
public opinion and for the use of public views and perceptions in ethics & policy. One 
problem is how to obtain and represent accurately the multitude of individual views and 
perceptions existing in the public. Some antagonism exists between quantitative and 
qualitative accuracy in this aspect of empirical research. In planning empirical research 
it is therefore crucial to decide the relative importance of these two basic aims viz. to 
determine accurately either the prevalence of views among the public and the nature of 
those views. The former requires a quantitative approach, the latter qualitative, and it is 
very difficult to achieve both at once. Both types of information are likely to be useful in 
different contexts.
4.2  concePtion, tHe eMBryo, tHe Foetus, Pregnancy anD liFe
PGD can alter the way in which many aspects of reproduction are experienced. This can be 
because it alters the actual phenomenon of reproduction, for example by the introduction of 
IVF into the process of conception. This displaces sex in these instances of procreation, which 
has been raised as an important moral consideration by the Catholic Church in particular. 
In Catholic morality, reproduction has two meanings, one unitive and one procreative, and 
the inseparability of these is something that ought to be protected.203 In this respect, IVF 
is unacceptable because it “voluntarily dissociates the two meanings of the conjugal act, 
promoting sexual intercourse devoid from its procreative meaning, and second, that assisted 
reproduction is unacceptable because it promotes procreation in the absence of sex”.204 This is 
thought to be particularly significant in countries such as Latin America, where almost 90% 
of the population identify themselves as Catholic. However evidence suggests that this may 
not be the primary factor determining reproductive decision-making in these countries, with 
individuals often primarily influenced by social and personal considerations.205
In couples undergoing IVF and particularly PGD the value of the sexual act in reproduction 
is usually offset to varying degrees by the stress and anxiety of its lack of poor or absent 
conception, miscarriage, or the birth of a child affected by a genetic disorder, or the potential 
of these to occur.206,207 For these patients the decision to undertake PGD has been described 
as “a ‘choice out of necessity’, or not really a ‘choice’ in the normal sense at all”.208 For these 
individuals the choices available are not having or raising children, adoption, gamete donation, 
spontaneous conception with the possibility or likelihood of having an affected child, prenatal 
testing with the option of termination, or PGD.209 Faced with this situation, other factors are 
often of greater significance in decision-making. Indeed, the notion that a disadvantage of 
PGD is that it interferes with natural reproduction was given high importance by only 16% 
and 24% of English males and females, respectively, who were carriers of recessive disorders 
(Table 1). Other factors such as health risks for the patients and their partners, the creation of 
surplus embryos, and the likelihood of success were given higher weightings.
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Table 1. Ratings of importance in decision-making (5 representing ‘very important’, 0 ‘not 
important’) of disadvantages of preimplantation genetic diagnosis in English carriers of recessive 
genetic conditions.210
Disadvantage % giving rating of 4 or 5
 Women  Men
May not be successful 4 3
can be painful 1 42
Possible health risks for you (and your partner) 46 
long waiting lists 60 4
Dilemma of what to do with spare embryos 51 30
it’s interfering with nature 24 16
The participants in this study have lived with the consequences of the condition they carry, 
nearly all of them having had an affected child, a third having had that child die, over half 
undergoing prenatal testing and 19% terminating a pregnancy as a result. This is a common 
history for couples presenting for PGD.211 These experiences can colour people’s attitudes to 
the factors mentioned, in favour of more concrete considerations which have been experienced 
over those which are more abstract.212,213,214,215,216 This is exemplified by a study in which all 
females at risk of beta-thalassaemia who had prior experience of a therapeutic abortion judged 
PGD as acceptable, compared to 30% of those women who had no experience of therapeutic 
abortion. This may account for the fact that participants in Snowden and Green’s study who 
had not terminated a pregnancy rated what may be considered the more abstract objection of 
‘interfering with nature’ as more important.217
Table 2. Ratings of importance in decision-making (5 representing ‘very important’, 0 ‘not 
important’) of advantages of preimplantation genetic diagnosis in English carriers of recessive 
genetic conditions.218
advantage % giving rating of 4 or 5
 Women  Men
child would be genetically related to both of you 6 3
child would not inherit the disorder 4 1
can find out whether the child is a carrier 56 44
can know from the start that child won’t have the disorder 4 4
no need to terminate pregnancy for the disorder 6 
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In contrast to the disadvantages examined (Table 1), carriers of genetic conditions generally 
rated the advantages of PGD as being of much greater importance (Table 2). Of particular 
relevance to perceptions of pregnancy, the embryo and foetus are the advantages of knowing 
from conception that the child does not have the genetic condition and that there will therefore 
be no need to consider termination of the pregnancy as a result of this. It has been shown 
that women undergoing prenatal testing often psychologically distance themselves from the 
embryo and foetus, often referring to ‘the pregnancy’ instead, until the status of the foetus 
is established.219 There is less need for this phenomenon if the genetic status of the foetus is 
known throughout pregnancy. The absence of these and other stresses goes some way towards 
accounting for the reported reduction in stress experienced by 40% of couples undergoing 
PGD who had previous experience of prenatal testing (PNT).220 
However in the same study 35% of couples felt more stress when undergoing PGD compared 
to PNT, perhaps due to the disadvantages mentioned and the added stress associated with 
undergoing IVF.221,222 However, despite these observations, 76% of the couples contemplating 
a further pregnancy would choose PGD, 16% would opt for prenatal diagnosis and 8% no 
tests at all.223
These preferences are supported by other research.224,225,226 However, one study has shown a 
preference for PNT over PGD in carriers of recessive genetic disorders, despite support for PGD 
as a useful reproductive option.227 The authors attributed this to methodological differences 
between their study and others, which serves to highlight the importance of methodological 
considerations in empirical research of this kind. Notably, the provision of information and 
the nature of the information provided differed between the studies, the population sampled, 
and the life situation of the participants were cited as factors which may account for the 
difference. The authors conclude:
In many ways, the preference for [PNT over PGD] found in our study is quite logical 
in that it is the most practical option for carriers of recessive disorders. Where a reliable 
test is available, they do not have to cope with the complications of other options such as 
limited accessibility, financial expenditure or possible problems over genetic relationships. 
A factor which is not addressed in this study but which is likely to be important is that 
for infertile couples intending to use [PNT], conception of their children remains a private 
affair rather than being placed in the public domain and assisted by doctors, scientists and 
technology.228
Notably absent from the considerations mentioned above are those relating to the embryo 
and foetus. This is an issue which is often central to discussions of PGD and PNT, since 
the two technologies differently involve and affect the embryo and foetus. The significance 
of this will depend on the ethical status which is attributed to the embryo and foetus. A 
thorough analysis of this issue has been presented in Section 3 of this Chapter and will not 
be reiterated here. However, it is important to note that the embryo and foetus are perceived 
differently by individuals, and this is affected in complex ways by innumerable factors. Often 
many individuals involved in the process of PGD, such as the clinician, the people seeking 
PGD, genetic counsellors, midwives and so on, will have different and potentially conflicting 
perceptions of the embryo. Examples of these are considering the embryo as a person, a 
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patient, a ‘nobody’ or a commodity229,230, as a child or potential child, or as human life or not.231 
To further complicate the picture, these categories are not necessarily accorded the same level 
of moral worth among members of the public. A selection of quotes from the American public 
illustrates the differing perceptions of the embryo and foetus:
[N]either of us felt that the embryo was a living thing until it was living inside me.232
[P]reimplantation genetics has almost redefined that life, in my opinion, would start upon 
implantation and not upon conception. Because it’s in the lab. An embryo at that stage 
cannot be sustained by itself. If it’s not implanted or frozen it will not turn into a human 
being. It needs to be implanted into a woman in order for it to become a human, so that’s 
why I don’t have a problem with preimplantation genetics.233
I approach this from a non-religious point of view… I don’t really believe in abortion, 
and it’s not a religious view; it’s just a view that I think life is great, and I think everybody 
should be alive. I think the more life the better, you know? And let life run its course.234
What I would call [PGD] is selective abortion because I believe that life begins at 
conception, which is when the sperm and egg unite. So, whether it is eight to ten cells, or 
a fully developed baby, I think that what you have done is scientifically produce twenty 
embryos, which I would call a baby.235
The following demonstrates the reasoning of a patient undergoing PGD, who summarises the 
harms and benefits of PGD for them, as they relate to the embryo, the potential child and the 
people involved in the PGD process, and compares this with PNT:
PGD… is more costly; almost as emotionally draining; and more painful, physically, than 
doing prenatal testing, but ethically, I feel better about doing it. Because I know that I’m 
not ending a life… to me, a ball of cells is not a child until it starts growing, so I don’t feel 
that I’m doing something bad or evil or unethical by not using certain embryos. So I just 
feel like I’m doing everything I can to create a healthy, happy child, rather than wait and 
find out if I’ve created a healthy and happy child.236
A common element of the reasoning in these examples is an emphasis on the ethical 
significance of life. Each person mentions the presence of life as an important characteristic in 
the embryo, which endows it with moral significance and causes some actions regarding the 
embryo to be considered wrong. It is interesting to note that the perception of life is, in most 
of these examples, discursively linked to the embryo being perceived in its potential states: that 
of being a baby or child.237 It is unclear whether these people regard the embryo as an actual 
baby, and therefore as possessing the same attributes which necessitate moral consideration. 
Another explanation is that the perception of life, which is often qualified as the potential for 
the embryo to become a baby, or child, or person, endows the embryo with moral status equal 
to that accorded to these states, by virtue of having this potential.
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4.3  cHilDren, FaMilies anD relationsHiPs
Other considerations that arise in public discussion of reproductive technologies such as 
PGD concern the desires of parents for their children. This is a source of some of the greatest 
controversy surrounding PGD, which is often criticised for allowing parents to choose the 
attributes of their children – the so called ‘designer babies’. Some conceptual confusion exists 
about what is meant by this term. It is sometimes taken to mean choosing a child based 
on frivolous or complex characteristics, such as eye and hair colour in the former case, or 
intelligence and musical ability in the latter. This criticism is often dismissed as naïvely 
optimistic about the current and future potential of genetic science to test for genetic traits. 
However, a designer baby can also be considered to be the selection of an embryo based on any 
characteristic(s), such as the absence of a genetic disease. The only difference between these 
two examples is arguably the significance of the attribute being selected for; in both cases the 
children-to-be are selected in the same way, albeit potentially for different reasons.
Fear of losing the opportunity to select against the presence of serious disorders as a result 
of criticisms levelled at selection based on non-medical attributes has led carriers of genetic 
disease to call for strict regulation of the technology:
I think it’s one of those things that’s got to be taken out of the individual’s decision-making 
process. I don’t think an individual should be allowed to make that decision about the 
baby…. It’s got to be a higher level because if – you know, like we’ve got a problem, that’s 
why we’re going through it. Unless there’s a problem, a genetic problem, then – that’s 
the only reason you should go through it! It should have nothing to do with, you know, 
whether folks are interested in how intelligent, or prefer a baby boy.238
However, public opinion regarding PGD is generally favourable for traits that are considered 
of great significance, such as severe or fatal genetic disorders.239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248 There is 
also a clear difference in public approval of this application of PGD over the testing for traits 
that are seen as non-medical, or less serious, which is generally thought to be unacceptable 
in these studies. Interestingly, even those members of the public who accord the embryo 
maximum moral status do not necessarily disagree with PGD to select for embryos free of 
serious genetic disease.249 
The following quotes from members of the public illustrate the consideration that is given to 
the seriousness of the disease being tested for:
It’s how you approach the word “choice” isn’t it? This gives us the choice of healthy from 
unhealthy, as opposed to choosing, you know, a blonde or a brunette, or a boy or a girl. 
This is choice out of necessity. Not for any other reason. […] So, I don’t think we have a 
choice really.250
Female: I mean if we was to find out that we was carriers of something else, and we were 
just going to produce a child that would inevitably be disabled, or whatever, we wouldn’t 
use PGD. You know, we see it as something that can… prevent children dying, basically, 
that’s why we’re using PGD.
Male: And it’s not even a case of um, I think with spinal muscular atrophy, it’s not even a 
case of “Well they might die”. They will! There’s no question about it, they will! 251
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These individuals express a sense of parental obligation to prevent the occurrence of suffering 
in their children, where this may be possible with PGD. This has been reflected in other research 
conducted in the US, with some members of the public expressing the opinion that: “You have 
a responsibility to bring a child into the world with a certain quality of life.”252
That judgments of quality of life are difficult to decide upon was expressed by an English 
woman who lost her first child to spinal muscular atrophy at 11 months of age:
I find myself […] saying, “That’s not what it’s about!” There’s nothing “designer” about 
having child that lives longer than 11 months….” …But I can understand that it is a very 
grey area. Because obviously … we’ve used PGD because we didn’t want to have another 
child that was going to within 12 months. But, I mean, at what point do you draw the 
line. At a child that dies at 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years? Where?... What 
conditions are we going to allow PGD to be used for?... I don’t know where the line should 
be drawn.253
The above quote demonstrates the difficulty in distinguishing between reasons which are 
considered important enough to warrant the use of PGD. Examples of this are testing for 
late-onset genetic diseases, and testing for diseases whose manifestation is more uncertain.254 
Another example is human leucocyte antigen (HLA) testing to select an embryo that will 
be able to provide tissue to improve the health of an existing sick sibling (so-called ‘saviour 
siblings’). In this case the aim of selection is not solely or necessarily to create a child free of 
genetic disease, but to create a child that can provide benefits to another. Another contentious 
example is sex selection, which may have different motivations such as achieving a desired sex 
ratio within a family, or because of other preferences for specific sexes of children. This can 
be a particular concern in societies where a preference exists for a certain sex of child, such 
as China, India and Korea.255,256 It is thought that a sex imbalance could occur as a result of 
PGD use for this purpose in susceptible countries, with negative consequences for population 
dynamics.257
However, the use of PGD to select for a child that is a HLA-match for a sibling with a serious 
disease is often viewed favourably by the public, as an instance of using PGD to remedy a 
serious genetic disorder: “I don’t think anyone wants to see their child die… you’d do anything 
to save the child’s life”. 258 This could be an instance of individuals deciding that, under these 
circumstances (the saving of an existing child’s life), they feel compelled to act in ways they 
nevertheless still judge to be unethical. A USA mother of a child with genetic disease stated 
“I think that there’s a lot worse things than having a child to save another child” 259, which 
still doesn’t mean the same thing as it being morally right to do so, although that may be 
her implication. However, it appears more likely to be a judgement that conceiving a ‘saviour 
sibling’ is not morally wrong in this situation, which is reflected in the majority approval of 
this use of PGD in countries such as the USA.260 
There is evidence that individuals also take into account their own interests, and those of 
others affected by their decision about what child to conceive. What follows is a metaphorical 
description of life caring for a child with a serious genetic disease, which emphasises the 
desperation of the situation for the care-givers:
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There’s water gushing in your boat, you’re sinking, you have a bucket. And you just keep 
taking the bucket and you throw water [out] to keep from sinking and there’s no break. It’s 
seven days a week, 24 hours a day. You don’t get a vacation. That’s it. You are stuck in this 
boat in the middle of the ocean with a hole in it with a bucket. And that is what life is like 
raising a boy with [cystic fibrosis].261
Other individuals undergoing PGD describe the network of people who they expect to be 
affected by the results of their decision, indicating a broad sphere of consideration in some 
deliberation about reproductive decisions:
We are very, very open – really open about it, and it’s just every decision we take is 
primarily for ourselves, but it affects everyone as well, all our friends, our families. Every 
decision we make is indirectly going to affect somebody else, and I think that’s where a lot 
of people don’t seem to get [PGD and] … IVF.262
However these considerations can also lead to fears that choices can be made for more frivolous 
self-regarding reasons. As two individuals from the USA stated, ‘We always want the best for 
our children. But we always want the best children, too.’263 An unacceptable example of this was 
identified by a patient undergoing PGD:
I think if parents are doing it for selfish reasons – like if they want to have the best-looking 
kids on the block – I think there should be a line drawn there. That’s for the vanity of 
the parents… [If] I want the tallest kids because I want my kid to be a basketball player 
– that, I think, is over the bounds.264
4.4  FreeDoM oF control over reProDuctive Decisions
The preceding discussion explored some notions regarding acceptable and unacceptable uses 
of PGD, and introduced the idea of some uses being restricted or prohibited. These two issues 
are linked by the stance taken on reproductive liberty and related issues. For example, an 
individual may judge a certain use of a reproductive technology such as PGD to be unacceptable 
– they may prefer it not to occur. However, the same individual and/or others may also have a 
commitment to protecting reproductive liberty, autonomy and privacy. Given that these two 
values refer to the same area of activity, and appear to be in conflict in some situations, there 
will need to be some negotiation between them if an individual or the public is committed to 
both. This tension is illustrated in the following quotes:
We have to depend on people’s morality to draw their own lines. We cannot legislate it… 
We can’t legislate any of this stuff.265
Why would you want someone else involved… what about your privacy? You have to have 
the permission of the government to do what you want with your sperm and egg?266
I am very uncomfortable with [using reproductive genetic testing to avoid] obesity, 
depression, those types of things. That is too big of a decision to give those parents, I mean, 
to say this child can’t exist because of these things or those things.267
I say yes if it all leads to eradicating horrifying diseases, and not wanting to pick their 
perfect little baby – whether it be a boy or a girl, blonde and blue-eyed.268
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Within the public there is a competition between these two attitudes, which are often 
diametrically opposed in terms of their normative implications. For example, in one survey 
of the USA public, 67% of respondents agreed with the proposition that the consequences 
of undertaking PGD were so personal that individuals should be allowed to decide for 
themselves, with the remainder disagreeing.269 Expressing a similar sentiment, in the same 
survey 70% of respondents were concerned about government regulators invading private 
reproductive decisions.270 However, in the same group of respondents 84% were concerned 
about unregulated reproductive technology getting out of control, with only 16% being 
unconcerned.271 Making policy decisions in such a situation of ethical grid-lock was discussed 
in Section 3 of this Chapter.
An exploration of public perceptions and opinions relating to PGD
Public opinion and perceptions relating to PGD
The views of the public regarding PGD generally converge on certain issues as being 
morally significant, and important to consider. It is thought that PGD has the potential to 
affect aspects of human life such as conception, the embryo, the foetus, and the nature of 
pregnancy. The introduction of technology into these aspects of life can dramatically alter 
the nature of it. For example, conception using PGD bares little resemblance to traditional 
methods. A pregnancy with knowledge of the absence of a genetic disorder in the foetus is 
also substantially different for those involved. The way we consider and relate to children, 
and the relationships within a family and in wider society are also considered to be affected 
by PGD. Discussion often centres on whether a child born through PGD is experiencing 
a conditional form of acceptance into a family or society, and what impact the use of 
this technology might have on children, parents, and society. Another strong theme in 
public views and perceptions is the importance of individual reproductive decisions. This 
includes whether or not decisions to use PGD should be unrestricted and private, and 
how much influence others should have on individual reproductive decisions. There is 
considerable disagreement among the public about the effect of PGD on these issues, and 
whether such effects might render the technology acceptable or unacceptable.
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5  conclusion
Thorough knowledge and consideration of public opinions and attitudes to issues relating to 
PGD are important components of any robust moral reasoning on the subject. Any deliberation 
that does not account for the ‘real-world’ in which technologies such as PGD will, and do 
exist, can have undesirable and unpredictable consequences. These include lack of public 
acceptance which renders policy ineffective or difficult to implement, or unintended social 
consequences, such as stigmatisation or poorer regard for individuals with genetic disorders 
or at-risk parents who eschew PGD. Perhaps the best way to gain an awareness of these factors 
is through conducting empirical research into the attitudes, perceptions and opinions of the 
public regarding technologies such as PGD. Research from overseas can provide a great deal of 
this information. However, several characteristics of New Zealand suggest that the New Zealand 
public may differ from those overseas in pertinent ways. These include the presence of many 
cultures in a relatively small population, and particularly the bicultural emphasis on Mäori 
and Päkehä in New Zealand society. All of these public groups may have views which differ 
from those examined overseas. The particular combination of attributes that PGD possesses 
make it different from other technologies introduced to New Zealand, and make it unwise to 
infer public perceptions and attitudes from extant research relating to other technologies, such 
as genetic modification. Conducting robust empirical social research into specific technologies 
such as PGD in New Zealand is therefore recommended in order to usefully inform ethical 
deliberation and the formulation of public policy.
In general, however, the public has sophisticated concerns about technologies which are 
implemented in the sphere of human reproduction. Some of these appear to be in conflict, 
which makes the formulation of public policy difficult, particularly if there are compelling 
reasons to formulate policy in spite of unresolved conflict. Different members of the public 
can have vastly different opinions about the proper uses of a technology such as PGD, and 
these are not necessarily accounted for by the categories which the members of the public 
fall into (such as disabled or non-disabled, male or female, etc.). Two, often heavily weighted 
considerations in the mind of the public, seem to be the relief or prevention of suffering and the 
related notion of improving well-being, and the autonomy of decision-making (particularly 
in the sphere of reproduction). Even in isolation from all the other factors that affect the 
public’s moral deliberation, these two factors are not straight-forwardly compatible. Ethical 
reasoning that takes into account all of the morally relevant facets of a technology such as PGD 
is therefore massively complex and simple answers are not easily forthcoming. However, this 
should encourage, rather than discourage, open, wide-ranging, patient and rigorous academic, 
political and public debate about these issues.
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